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Part One 
GROWTH, DISEQUIUBRIUM AND DISPARITIES: 




THE SPREAD OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS IN LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE PROBLEMS IT INVOLVES 
1. A NEW STAGE IN THE SPREAD OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS 
The spread of technical progress from the countries where it had its 
source to the rest of the world has, from the point of view of each 
generation, been relatively slow and irregular. During the long period 
which elapsed between the industrial revolution and the First World War, 
the new methods of production in which technique has constantly found 
its expression have reached only a small proportion of the world's 
population. 
The movement began in the United Kingdom, continued in varying 
degrees of intensity in Europe, received an extraordinary impulse in the 
United States and finally reached Japan, which strove to rapidly assimi-
late Western methods of production. Thus the great industrial centres 
of the world grew up, while the vast and heterogeneous peripheral areas 
of the new system shared only to a slight extent in the improvement of 
productivity. 
In these peripheral areas, technical progress «only affected small sectors 
of the vast population as it usually only penetrated where it was needed 
to produce foodstuffs and raw materials at low cost for delivery to the 
great industrial centres. 
If this economic pattern which the world had developed before the 
First World War could have been considered the ideal system of the divi-
sion of labour, any departure from its principles would, of course, have 
had to be considered as a deviation from the economy's normal way of 
functioning. However, there could be no sound, scientific reason for believ-
ing that this was a final pattern. All that happened in that period was 
that the world economy passed through a singularly important stage in 
its growth, but in spite of the significance of its effects, it could hardly 
be called a final stage since, to a certain extent, it had left untouched the 
vast peripheral area with its enormous potential capacity for assimilating 
technical progress so as to raise the very inadequate standard of living 
of the great masses of its population. 
Carefully considered, the economic development of the peripheral coun-
tries is one more stage in the world-wide spread of the new forms of 
productive technique, or, if preferred, in the organic development of 
world economy. A few early signs of this new stage had already appeared 
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in the primary producer countries before the First World War. But it 
was the war, with the consequent difficulties of maintaining imports, 
which revealed the industrial possibilities of those countries, while the 
great economic depression of the 1930's strengthened the conviction that 
those possibilities had to be used in order to offset, by means of internal 
development, the manifest failure of the external incentive which until 
then had stimulated Latin-American economy; this conviction was con-
firmed during the Second World War, when Latin-American industry, 
with all its improvisations and difficulties, nevertheless became a source 
of employment and of consumption for a large and increasing part of the 
population. 
Latin America has, therefore, entered a new stage in the world-wide 
spread of technique, though technical methods are still far from having 
been assimilated completely in primary production, for, as explained 
above, new production methods tend to be adopted in activities con-
nected in one way or another with the exportation of foodstuffs and 
raw materials rather than in other activities. In the performance of this 
function as a primary producer which is actually the function of Latin 
America, there was from the beginning a strict selection of aptitudes. 
Vast regions were coupled to the world economic system while others, 
no less large and generally more densely populated ones, up to the 
present time, remained outside the system. Hence development was very 
uneven. New and fertile lands, which became accessible during the 
second half of the last century through the development of transport, 
acquired human material, technique and capital with which to undertake 
agricultural and mineral production to satisfy the ever-growing European 
demand, whereas the impressive process of the extension of capitalist 
technique and economy by-passed other lands which had been cultivated 
for ages and which had supported their populations for centuries but 
which suffered from a low level of productivity or difficulties of access. 
Thus in Latin America there remain extensive regions, with relatively 
large populations, in which the methods of working the land, and conse-
quently the standard of living of the people, are essentially pre-capitalist. 
Accordingly, economic development in these countries requires first and 
foremost technical progress in agriculture and other related activities, 
including means of communication. 
Experience has repeatedly shown, however, that as modern technique 
increases productivity, a surplus of labour, no longer needed by agricul-
ture, is created. It then becomes the task of industry and other activities 
to absorb this labour productively. Hence agricultural improvement and 
industrial development are two aspects of the problem of economic devel-
opment. One need only consider the large number of people engaged in 
agriculture in Latin America, with the exception of a few countries, to 
realize the magnitude of this problem and the vast effort which will be 
necessary to solve it. 
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Through the force of circumstances, with the spread of technical progress 
an increasing proportion of the economically active population of Latin 
America, as part of the peripheral area, will be diverted from agriculture 
towards industry and other urban occupations. Yet, that would not con-
stitute a full solution unless certain pre-capitalist or semi-capitalist methods 
of production (still used by a large part of thé population) were to evolve 
towards methods characterized by a high level of capitalization per man 
and high productivity. Though this is indeed very important, the problem 
of the economic development of Latin America cannot be limited to these 
terms, for to do so would be to ignore other fundamental aspects. This 
is not surprising, for though there are certain common denominators in 
the appearance of the problem in the different countries, there are also 
specific differences which must be considered lest unwarranted generali-
zations are arrived at. 
2. TWO DIFFERENT CASES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
First of all, as already stated, one of these differences lies in the actual 
manner in which technical progress penetrates. In order to illustrate 
this, let us consider two extreme cases : Mexico and Argentina. Argentina 
is a peripheral country into whose lands, only recently opened up for 
cultivation, the technique of capitalist production has been penetrating 
deeply since the second half of the nineteenth century. Except for a few 
centres, there was no long-established agriculture and the land, till then 
deserted or sparsely populated, attracted large numbers of immigrants 
and capital. The population grew in strict relation to the technical and 
economic development, which in turn was due to a strong and continuous 
stimulation from abroad. The growth of the Argentine economy depended 
almost exclusively upon that external stimulation until the beginning of 
the world economic crisis. 
When this type of economic and demographic growth began in Argen-
tina, Mexico was already relatively well settled, with an agricultural 
tradition; its land, already exhausted by the pressure of a constantly 
increasing population, could not compete with the new agricultural areas. 
There was no incentive to bring new methods from outside to Mexican 
agriculture, which thus tended to keep its pre-capitalist ways with their 
very low coefficient of productivity per man. Mexico, therefore, entered 
the world system not by means of its age-old subsistence agriculture, but 
by means of the working of mineral resources, and the exportation of 
Yucatán henequén, especially the former, which in time was to become 
more important than the extraction of precious metals of legendary fame. 
But the working of mineral resources and the activities which are directly 
or indirectly related to it only absorb a very small proportion of the 
Mexican population. A large part remains stationary in long-established 
ways of life and activities and with no direct connexion with the world 
market, so that these sectors of the population have not been strongly influ-
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enced by the external stimulus of development. Despite the recent addition 
of other strong internal stimuli, these groups of the population continue to 
give Mexico's economy the features typical of under-developed areas. In fact, 
65 per cent of the gainfully employed population is still engaged in agri-
culture, which represents barely 30 per cent of - the value of Mexican 
exports, while in Argentina, where exports are still essentially agricul-
tural, only 36 per cent of the economically active population works on 
the land. 
Consequently the problem of economic development which Mexico is 
making such great efforts to solve consists of replacing the old agricul-
ture with its low productivity by a new one with a higher yield per man. 
Then the surplus of labour already mentioned occurs for which a place 
must also be found within the sphere of capitalist technique. Moreover, 
if it is borne in mind that the population growth of Mexico is among 
the most vigorous, the extent of the problem is easily realized. 
The case of Argentina is different. It is not that of a large population 
in a pre-capitalist state, nor of one growing at a rate comparable to 
that of Mexico, though technique is certainly far from having reached 
a satisfactory state in Argentina, even in agriculture, and there is there-
fore room for considerable improvement. The problem of economic growth 
here lies fundamentally in the considerable weakening of the external 
impulse, which had exerted such a strong influence until the beginning 
of the great world crisis. The ever-increasing world demand for its exports 
during this first stage of Argentine development was not only the means 
of absorbing the then very rapid natural growth of the population, but 
also of attracting and settling there large masses of European immigrants. 
During the 1930's, however, the volume of Argentine exports, instead 
of continuing to rise, tended actually to decline, so that if after that time 
it was possible to absorb the population increase and improve productivity, 
it was because the weakened external stimulus became subsidiary to the 
deliberate one of industrialization. 
The common denominator referred to above lies precisely in the condi-
tions to which industrialization is leading. Exports are not sufficient to 
absorb the increase in population, still less the surplus, real or potential, 
of the economically active population engaged in agriculture or other 
activities. This fact thus constitutes a feature common to the economic 
development of Mexico, Argentina, and the other Latin-American coun-
tries. Not even Venezuela can be counted an exception, despite the exten-
sive increase in its exports, as will be explained later. 
3. VARIABLES IN THE PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
It is clear that the problem varies from country to country according 
to a number of factors, of which we shall at this point mention those 
directly relevant. If productivity is to be improved, then, even where 
the natural resources exist and the population is capable of assimilating 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA : INCREASE OF TOTAL POPULATION, GAINFULLY EMPLOYED POPULATION BY 

























































































































Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. 
Notes: The basic data were taken from: official sources of these countries; The 
Foreign Trade of Latin America, U.S. Tariff Commission; Economic Survey of 
Latin America, 1948, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America; 
Statistical Yearbook and Demographic Yearbook, United Nations ; and Foreign Com-
merce Weekly, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
The figures referring to the percentages of population engaged in agricultural 
activities and primary production correspond to the following years: Colombia, 1938; 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru, 1940; Venezuela, 1941; Cuba, 1943; 
Panama, 1945 ; and Argentina, 1947. 
technical progress, the amount of capital per man employed must be 
increased, in agriculture as well as in industry and transportation; this 
means that the greater the population in a pre-capitalist or semi-capitalist 
state and the higher its rate of growth, the greater is the need for capital. 
In most of these countries there are serious difficulties in the way of 
the internal formation of the necessary savings to accumulate this capital ; 
in addition to this, there is another equally important limiting factor : the 
amount of exports, upon which these countries depend to transform their 
savings into imports of capital goods, the greater part of which must 
be brought from the great industrial centres. Here, too, there are striking 
differences between one country and another, which, together with the 
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differing capital needs and other factors, contribute towards the divergence 
in the terms of the problem of development. 
Without touching here upon the subject of the second section of this 
survey, and for the sole purpose of pointing out some of the differences, 
we would refer to table 1 which shows the value of exports in US dollars 
per capita, the average rate of the annual population increase, and the 
proportion of people employed in agriculture; this table conveys an idea 
of the population, which in most cases, is still in a pre- or semi-capitalist 
state. 
To return to the case of Mexico : it is easy to see how acute is the 
problem of economic development in that country. On the one hand, the 
population increase is high and the proportion of people employed in 
agriculture very high indeed; hence the potential needs for capital are 
enormous ; on the other hand, the exports with which they must be satis-
fied are amongst the lowest per capita. Brazil is in a similar position. 
These are the two most highly populated countries of Latin America, a 
circumstance which lends special emphasis to these data. 
Cuba, on the other hand, is in a more favourable situation. The rate 
of the population increase there is lower and so is the proportion of people 
employed in agriculture, whereas Cuba's per capita exports rank with 
those of Venezuela amongst the highest in Latin America. In this respect, 
there is a certain resemblance between the two countries, though in Vene-
zuela exports are increasing at a very rapid rate, while in Cuba they 
have suffered from the depressive factors common to most Latin-American 
countries. 
Finally (though we do not propose to enter into too much detail at this 
stage) in Argentina the rate of population growth is lower than, and 
the percentage employed in agriculture equal to that of Chile and lower 
than that of the other countries; yet Argentine exports, despite a ten-
dency to decline in volume since the world economic crisis, as already 
stated, still represent a high per capita value, though not equal to that 
of Venezuela and Cuba. But since this value expressed in dollars of a 
constant purchasing power, is tending to decrease, it is not surprising 
to find that the insufficiency of these exports constitutes a serious obstacle 
in the way of Argentine economic development. 
This shows that it is not enough to take into account the amount of 
exports at a given time in order to judge the terms of the problem of 
economic development; their rate of increase must also be considered. 
Exports which seem very satisfactory may soon no longer be so, if the 
rate of internal growth is rapid. This point will be discussed later; we 
would only mention at this stage that, apart from the case of Venezuela, 
referred to above, the increase in the volume of exports does not appear 
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sufficient on the whole to satisfy the need for imports which economic 
development brings with it.1 
At this point, and again disregarding the case of Venezuela, we come 
to the second common denominator. The first, as already stated, consists 
of the insufficiency of exports to provide employment for the surplus 
manpower arriving from the increase in population and from technical 
progress in primary production. The second is that exports are also 
inadequate to meet the demands of the economic development. This gives 
rise to a very important phenomenon : the tendency towards persistent 
disequilibrium in the balance of payments, a phenomenon generally in-
herent in the process of economic development. Let us now attempt to 
analyse this phenomenon. 
4. T H E INCREASE IN INCOME AND DISEQUILIBRIUM 
The fundamental economic problem of Latin America lies in increasing 
its real per capita income by virtue of an increase in productivity, since 
the raising of the living standards of the masses by means of the redistri-
bution of income is very strictly limited. An increase in per capita income 
means that total income must increase at a greater rate than the popula-
tion. When this occurs, imports likewise tend to rise at a greater rate 
than population. If exports do not follow suit there will of course be a 
disequilibrium in the balance of payments, with consequent effects upon 
the domestic economy. 
To understand this phenomenon, let us take an ideal case of dynamic 
equilibrium in which exports and total income increase at the same steady 
rate as the population and imports in turn rise in the same proportion 
as exports. Dynamic equilibrium therefore in this case means that pro-
ductivity remains constant and consequently there is no increase in per 
capita income. Let us now assume that technical improvements are intro-
duced into agriculture for domestic consumption, with consequent higher 
productivity and hence higher income, and examine the consequences. 
By means of these improvements, it is possible to increase production 
with less labour employed. Two immediate consequences arise : an increase 
in productivity per man and a surplus of labour in agriculture. There 
will have been an increase in the real income of the community from 
agriculture, since the increased productivity will either have benefited the 
producers, by increasing their profits, or the consumers, through lower 
prices. At the same time, the employment of the surplus manpower in 
other activities would mean a further increase of real income, which 
together with the previous one makes up the total increase of income. 
The disequilibrium becomes apparent immediately. A part of the increase 
in income will tend to be spent on imports, raising them above their 
1
 For the sake of simplicity, the analysis will be limited to exports and imports 
without reference to other items of the balance of payments, which it would be easy 
to include. 
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normal rate of increase and causing them to exceed exports. The import 
coefficient need not necessarily have varied; however, it is probable that 
it also would have been stepped up, for two reasons : first, because there 
must be greater imports of capital goods in order to increase productiv-
ity; and secondly, because of certain typical reactions of a peripheral 
country. In fact, observation shows that at a given moment the import 
coefficient is very low in groups with low productivity and a low level 
of income per person, and that it rises progressively in relation to the 
income group; thus, when there is a rise in income, per person, of either 
the primary producers or the consumers, the favoured groups will increase 
their import coefficient and contribute to a rise in the total coefficient. 
If this should occur, the disequilibrium between imports and exports 
would be still greater. 
The disequilibrium in internal demand is closely linked to that in the 
balance of trade. It is obvious that the increase in income has its counter-
part in the value of the goods and services the production of which 
yields this income,2 so that if a part of the increase in income is spent 
on imports, an equal amount of internal demand will disappear, which 
causes a disequilibrium with regard to the greater production offered. 
Such a disequilibrium would not occur in the ideal case of steady 
development mentioned above, for then imports would rise at the same 
rate as total income and exports, and the strict correlation between the 
two would be assured. At the same time, the fall in internal demand caused 
by greater imports would be compensated by the normal increase in the 
income of export industries and by the internal demand deriving from it. 
This suggests that if the manpower displaced from agriculture for 
domestic consumption had been employed in increasing exports, the 
disequilibrium would not have arisen. This possibility is carefully exam-
ined at the end of the chapter. Meanwhile other aspects of the problem 
must first be considered to maintain the sequence of the argument. 
So far it has been assumed that technical progress has only been intro-
duced into agriculture for domestic consumption. What would happen if 
this progress had been placed in the service of industries producing for 
export? In this case, as in the preceding one, it is assumed that the 
external demand for the exports of the country in question increases at 
the same regular and constant rate as the population of that country 
and that the demand does not make it possible to step up exports at a 
higher rate. This being so, the manpower surplus produced by technical 
progress cannot be employed in the export industry. If industry and 
other activities are developed in order to absorb it, an increase in real 
income will also occur, as in the previous case, with the same effects 
upon the balance of payments and internal activity. 
2
 This statement is theoretically incorrect, as in any process of increasing production 
the cash income is always greater than the value of the finished production. However, 
it is a theoretical nicety which we may disregard for the purpose of the matter under 
discussion. 
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It is obvious that if, when the national income of a country increases 
at a greater rate than its population, exports did the same, there would 
be no disequilibrium. However, this has not been the general experience 
in the Latin-American countries during the last twenty-five years, as the 
next chapter indicates. It now becomes easy to understand the reason 
for certain tendencies towards a chronic disequilibrium in the balance 
of payments observable in some of these countries which are anxious to 
increase productivity and raise the standard of living of the population. 
It is true that inflation is partly, often chiefly, responsible for this; but 
in order to arrive at the truth, the organic phenomenon of economic 
development must be distinguished from the circumstantial phenomenon 
of inflation. To the degree that the import coefficient remains in one 
way or another unadjusted—when total income increases at a greater 
rate than exports and when no foreign investments are made to cover 
the time lag until readjustment takes place—the tendency toward dis-
equilibrium will be constant and will inevitably have monetary conse-
quences whether inflation is present or not. 
Since inflation is usually accompanied by a notable increase in imports 
of capital goods, it might be thought that if these were paid for with 
real savings and not with inflationary resources, no disequilibrium would 
occur. It would, however, occur even if the capitalization were effected 
without inflation, since, whereas only a part of the income formerly 
consumed and now saved, was spent in imports, according to the co-
efficient, now the whole is spent. 
5. T H E SURPLUS OF MANPOWER IN PRIMARY PRODUCTION, AND EXPORTS 
It has just been explained how, when income increases at a greater 
rate than population, economic development is accompanied by phenomena 
of disequilibrium, which occur because exports are not then adequate 
to meet the demands of the development. In other words, the capacity 
to import does not grow in proportion to the necessity to import. It was 
also explained above that in the same way exports are insufficient to 
provide employment for the surplus manpower arising from the increase 
in population and from technical progress in primary production. 
There are, however, other possible forms of international economy, in 
which Latin-American exports could be very much greater than they 
now are. It is sometimes thought that the primary producing countries 
might perhaps, as in former times, have continued to increase their 
exports, had they still been disposed to accept as payment imports from 
the industrial centres. On the assumption that the latter reciprocated, 
it could be claimed, there would have been no reason for the above-
mentioned phenomena of disequilibrium to take place. 
The nature of this report precludes the discussion of economic policies 
and the indication of the advantages and disadvantages of alternative 
solutions. There is, however, an objective question which may be asked 
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and which concerns the analysis undertaken in these pages. If the typical 
primary-producer countries which include those of Latin America, were 
to employ in the export industries both thé surplus of manpower arising 
from technical progress and the natural increase of population, would 
the import capacity of the industrial centres be sufficient to absorb the 
considerable increase of Latin-American exports ? 
In order to answer this question, we must first examine the influence 
which technical progress has had on the distribution of employment of 
the population. 
It is a well-known fact that, at the primitive technical stage, the pro-
portion of people employed in agriculture and other branches of primary 
production is very high ; as technique improves, this proportion diminishes 
and there is an increase in the relative numbers employed in industry, 
trade, transport and public services. 
In the United States about a century ago, 67 per cent of the gainfully 
employed population was engaged in primary production, while today 
scarcely 27 per cent is so employed. In Argentina, as will be shown later, 
the proportion has fallen to 36 per cent, even though primary production 
continues to be the chief source of exports. On the other hand, in coun-
tries where agriculture is still almost entirely in the pre-capitalist stage, 
the proportion is generally over 50 per cent and in some cases nearly 
70 per cent. 
The pattern of the distribution of employment is not arbitrary. In each 
country and epoch it depends principally upon the state of productive 
technique and upon the quantity and quality of the resources of all kinds 
which render it profitable. When technique is in a primitive state, it is 
logical that in view of the low productivity, a large part of the gainfully 
employed population should be engaged in producing foodstuffs and raw 
materials and in elementary processing. As technique improves and fewer 
people are needed to obtain more primary products, the surplus of gain-
fully employed population, together with the natural increase, become 
employed in industry, transport and trade, as a logical consequence of 
the expanding markets and specialization and diversification of produc-
tion. In the same way, with the growth of productivity and real income 
per person, there is an increase in the demand for certain personal 
services; furthermore the State, as its functions expand, absorbs an 
increasing proportion of the additional real income and also of the gain-
fully employed population. 
Thus, as technical progress spreads to the peripheral countries and 
especially when it penetrates the pre-capitalist and semi-capitalist sectors 
of their economy, the distribution of the gainfully employed population 
necessarily undergoes substantial changes. 
Are there any special reasons for supposing that the consequences of 
the phenomenon of the spread of technique in the peripheral areas would 
THE SPREAD OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS IN LATIN AMERICA 13 
be different from those which took place in the countries in which technical 
progress had previously developed ? 
Let us suppose for a moment that the peripheral countries decided, as 
productivity in primary production rose, to continue to employ therein 
the same proportion of people as now. The result would be that through-
out the world there would be a surplus of primary products which could 
not be processed, transported or distributed according to the technical 
standards reached, because there would not be sufficient gainfully em-
ployed population to do these jobs; there would be a surplus of labour 
in primary production and a shortage in secondary production. 
This is inadmissible, both from a logical and an empirical point of 
view; technical progress forges links of interdependence between the 
various branches of economic activity which cannot be altered lightly. 
Just as the development of industry, transport and trade, as well as 
services, needs the labour which is no longer necessary to primary pro-
duction, the latter in its turn could not expand further without a corre-
sponding development of these other activities. 
Hence the problem is not whether industry and similar activities should 
or should not be developed when productivity rises in primary produc-
tion, but whether the increase in industry, resulting from the extension 
of technical progress, should take place in the existing industrial centres 
or in the new centres which are appearing. 
6. T H E MOBILITY OF PRODUCTIVE FACTORS 
A good many of the peripheral countries, including those of Latin 
America, appear to have decided to make their own economies the basis 
of the development, of industry, but it is not without interest to discuss 
briefly the conditions which would have to be fulfilled in order to carry 
out the opposite policy : namely, that the existing industrial centres should 
continue increasing their industries, while the periphery continued to 
devote itself to primary production. 
It has already been seen that when technical progress is extended to 
primary production, it produces a surplus of gainfully employed popula-
tion in that sector which can be absorbed by industry and other activities. 
If these other activities were not developed in the periphery, they would 
automatically have to develop in the centres which would consequently 
have to absorb the surplus manpower, in addition to that part of the 
natural increase in population which could not be absorbed in their own 
primary production. 
This presupposes complete mobility of population; in other words it 
would mean not only that the unemployable surplus of the population must 
be willing to emigrate from the periphery, overcoming a rooted unwilling-
ness, but also that the countries of the centre must be prepared to admit 
large masses of immigrants who, accustomed to relatively low wages, 
would compete to advantage with the workers of the centre. 
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This demonstrates that the idea that the peripheral countries should 
continue to act as primary producers as they did during a particular 
stage in the process of the extension of technique, according to the precepts 
of the international division of labour, is based upon certain assumptions 
which do not appear compatible with the economic and social reality of 
the world as this has emerged since the process started. 
The logical consequences of the premise of mobility of productive 
factors, which is the postulate on which the theoretical concept of the 
international division of labour is built up, are very far-reaching and 
must be borne in mind in any attempt to interpret the significance of this 
reality by theory. 
If this premise of mobility had been an actual fact, the economic and 
social effects of technical progress, and the way it spread, would cer-
tainly have been very different from what actually took place. This point 
will be referred to again in the following chapters. 
CHAPTER II 
WEAKENING OF LATIN AMERICA'S CAPACITY TO IMPORT 
DURING THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 
1. LATIN-AMERICAN EXPORTS: VOLUME AND COMPARATIVE PRICES 
It has been shown that with the increase of per capita income deriving 
from increased productivity, total income increases at a greater rate than 
population and that the rate of imports also tends to be higher. 
If a persistently unfavourable balance of payments in a newly developing 
country is to be avoided, its capacity to import should increase pari passu 
with this tendency of imports, or, failing this, the import coefficient should 
be lowered as much as is necessary. 
In the second part of the present report, we will consider the manner 
in which this phenomenon has occurred in the various Latin-American 
countries during the last twenty-five years. However, continuing our 
analysis, let us see how far the capacity to import has increased in rela-
tion to the growth of the population within Latin America. 
The capacity to import depends fundamentally upon the volume of a 
country's exports and the price relationship between its exports and 
imports. Of course, foreign-capital investments affect import capacity, but 
the ability to make the interest and amortization payments on these invest-
ments also depends on the total volume of exports and their relative 
prices. However, we will not consider this question at this stage. 
Let us first trace the development of Latin America's exports. For this 
purpose, indices have been prepared showing the fluctuations in their 
total volume, the indices for each country being weighted according to 
the U.S. dollar value of its 1937 exports. These indices are compared with 
the growth of population in curves 2 and 1, respectively, of chart 1. 
In order to simplify the comparison, the two curves have been super-
imposed during the five-year period 1925-29. The corresponding figures 
are shown in table 2 A, which also includes other data mentioned later 
in this section. These curves, like all those on the charts attached to this 
chapter, have been prepared with the use of a semi-logarithmic scale in 
order to simplify comparison of the degree of fluctuation of the phe-
nomena. The adverse effect of the world economic crisis upon exports 
is impressive : in the early 1930's the index dropped steeply and though 
some of the loss was made up, the curve remained very low for the rest 
of the decade in comparison with population, so much so that the marked 
IS 
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Chart 1 
LATIN AMERICA : POPULATION, EXPORTS AND CAPACITY TO IMPORT 
Semi-logarithmic scale 
1. Population. 
2. Volume of exports. 
3. Capacity to import. 
4. Terms of trade. 
5. Import prices. 
6. Export prices. 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. 
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increase shown by exports in the next decade was barely enough to 
emerge above the level prevailing before the crisis. During the five-year 
period 1945-49, exports were only 16.3 per cent higher than during the 
five-year period 1925-29, whereas Latin America's total population in-
creased 44.3 per cent. The quantum of per capita exports was thus reduced 
by 19.1 per cent during those twenty-five years. 
Table 2 A 
LATIN AMERICA: POPULATION, EXPORTS AND CAPACITY TO IMPORT, 1925-1949 
(Base: 1937=100) 
Quantum index 
of Index of capacity 
exports Price Index to import 
Population • Terms of 
Year (Millions) Total Per capita Export Import trade Total Per capita 
1925 97.0 846 ÍÕU 13Ü9 1341 101.4 85Ü 105.3 
1926 98.9 88.4 106.4 124.7 131.0 95.2 84.2 101.3 
1927 100.7 99.0 117.0 121.7 120.0 101.4 100.4 118.7 
1928 102.6 103.0 119.5 122.9 119.0 103.3 106.4 123.4 
1929 104.3 108.7 124.1 113.2 117.0 96.7 105.1 120.0 
1930 105.9 90.4 101.6 90.2 113.0 79.8 72.1 81.0 
1931 107.4 98.1 108.6 61.6 95.0 64.8 63.6 70.4 
1932 109.3 82.0 89.3 53.4 76.0 70.3 57.6 62.7 
1933 111.0 84.7 90.8 57.8 80.0 72.3 61.2 65.6 
1934 112.8 85.6 90.3 81.5 91.0 89.6 76.7 80.9 
1935 114.9 93.8 97.1 77.6 92.0 84.3 79.1 81.9 
1936 117.2 90.3 91.7 87.6 94.0 93.2 84.2 85.5 
1937 119.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1938 121.6 91.1 89.1 83.4 99.0 84.2 76.7 75.0 
1939 124.3 97.0 92.9 81.5 99.0 82.3 79.8 76.4 
1940 126.5 85.7 80.6 85.5 109.0 78.4 67.2 63.2 
1941 129.2 93.3 85.9 93.4 117.0 79.8 74.4 68.5 
1942 . .. 131.5 77.6 70.2 113.9 141.0 80.8 62.7 56.7 
1943 . .. 134.2 88.9 78.8 124.7 154.0 80.9 71.9 63.7 
1944 136.9 99.8 86.8 130.7 169.0 77.3 77.1 67.0 
1945 139.9 104.5 88.9 133.8 167.0 80.1 83.7 71.2 
1946 ' . 142.6 111.6 93.2 171.3 163.0 105.1 117.3 97.9 
1947 " " 145.2 115.6 94.8 217.5 191.0 113.9 131.7 108.0 
1948 " . .. 148.3 120.8 97.0 229.5 208.4 110.1 133.0 106.7 
1949 ; 150.7 111.5 88.1 216.9 195.5 110.9 122.5 96.8 
Percentage of variation with respect to the annual average for 1925-1929 
1945-49 44.3 16.6 -19.1 56.7 49.2 4.4 22.1 -15.6 
1949 ..'.':.:.' 49.6 15.3 -22.9 75.3 57.7 11.3 27.2 -14.9 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. 
Notes: Population estimated according to official figures for each country, and the 
United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. 
The quantum index of exports was obtained by weighing the national quantum 
indices according to the US dollar value of the exports in 1937. 
The price index of exports has been arrived at by dividing the index of the value 
of Latin-American exports in US dollars by their quantum index. 
The import price index corresponds to the direct arithmetic average of the export 
price index of the United Kingdom in United States dollar equivalents and the export 
price index of finished products of the United States. 
The index of the capacity to import is the product of the terms of trade and the 
quantum index of exports. 
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Unfortunately, the terms of trade, so far from offsetting this move-
ment, tended to sharpen its effects. In order to measure these variations, 
a price index of Latin-American exports has been calculated, and its 
fluctuations are represented by curve 6 on the aforesaid chart. It would 
have been useful to compare these prices with those of imports, but ade-
quate data for all the countries concerned are not available. Pending 
further research, the average prices of exports from the United States 
and Great Britain have been used as a tentative indication of the cost of 
Latin America's imports. These averages are represented by curve 5 on 
the chart. 
The ratio of export to import prices, thus computed, gives us the 
Latin-American terms of trade, shown by curve 4 on the chart. It should 
be noted that, after the high level reached during the 1925-29 period, 
these terms deteriorated considerably during the crisis ; a fair part of the 
loss was subsequently made up, but the improvement was short-lived. 
The terms of trade declined again in the early 1940's, and remained at a 
low level until the end of the decade, when they rose and finally rose 
above the level of the late 1920's. Thus, the average for the five-year 
period 1945-49 is 4.4 per cent higher than the 1925-29 average. 
From this analysis, it is now possible to calculate an index of the 
fluctuations in Latin America's capacity to import. For this purpose, 
the index of the quantum of exports was multiplied by the index of the 
terms of trade. The resultant index gives us an idea of the fluctuations 
of the volume of goods which Latin America could import, as a function 
of the volume exported and the relative prices of these exports. The fluc-
tuations of this new index are indicated on curve 3. 
During a large part of the period under observation, capacity to import 
decreased even more than the volume of exports, due to the unfavourable 
trend of the terms of trade. Thus despite its fluctuations the index 
remained far below that of population, and only in the last few years do 
we find the capacity to import rising to what it might have been, had it 
continued to increase at the same rate as the population. In 1945-49, 
it was only 22.1 per cent higher than in 1925-29, whereas the population, 
as mentioned before, had increased by 44.3 per cent, and per capita 
capacity to import was thus reduced by 15.6 per cent. 
In order to simplify comparison, the following table has been prepared 
to show the five-yearly averages corresponding to the annual figures given 
in table 2 A. 
The data are not sufficient for the satisfactory measurement of the 
phenomena. This would require very detailed investigation, demanding 
time and labour not now available. It is not merely a question of analysing 
export and import prices; in addition it would be interesting to deter-
mine what percentage of the export price remains in the exporting country. 
For instance, statistics appended to another chapter show that Chile 
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Table 2 B 
LATIN AMERICA: POPULATION, EXPORTS AND CAPACITY TO IMPORT, 1925-49 
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Note: For source and annotations, see table 2 A. 
is now receiving a greater proportion of the international price of copper 
than was the case at the beginning of the quarter-century under review; 
the same applies in the case of Venezuela and its petroleum exports. 
Facts such as these, possibly of considerable importance, are not imme-
diately apparent from the price relations we have analysed. Moreover, 
the price indices of industrial exports, used in calculating those relations, 
do not allow for the improvement in quality of the goods, and yet this 
has certainly been much greater than in the case of raw materials. The 
foregoing conclusions should therefore be regarded as provisional, pending 
further research. 
2. UNITED STATES IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA 
Yet, apart from some isolated cases, during the past twenty-five years 
the volume of Latin-American exports certainly did not increase as much 
as the population and the movement of price relations did not tend to 
offset this disparity. Ever since Latin America entered the international 
trade market, about the middle of the nineteenth century, no similar 
phenomenon of like significance had occurred. Yet it is highly important 
in relation to problems of economic development and warrants detailed 
analysis. Accordingly we shall examine the trend in the last twenty-five 
years of Latin-American exports to the United States and Great Britain, 
two countries which account for a considerable proportion of Latin Amer-
ica's total export volume. 
We shall first try to discover what happened in the case of Latin-
American exports to the United States. Chart 2, which was prepared for 
this purpose, shows the fluctuations of real income in the United States, 
at constant prices represented by curve 3, in relation to imports (also 
at constant prices), that is, in relation to the volume represented by 
curve 2. The curves are superimposed during the 1925-29 period and the 
corresponding statistics will be found in table 3 A. 
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Table 3 A 
SEAL INCOME OF THE UNITED STATES, IN RELATION TO ITS IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA 








































































































































































































































































Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. 
Note: Basic data for the calculation of real income, imports and the import coefficient 
were obtained from : National Income in the United States, by Robert Martin ; Statistical 
Abstract of the United States: Statistical Yearbook, United Nations and Historical 
Statistics of the United States. 
The export price index has been calculated by the Economic Commission for Latin 
America on a basis of the 14 principal products exported by Latin America to the 
United States. Import prices were based on the export price indices for manufactured 
products finished in the United States. 
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Chart 2 
REAL INCOME OF THE UNITED STATES, IN RELATION TO ITS IMPORTS FROM 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE LATTER'S CAPACITY TO IMPORT AS A FUNCTION 
OF ITS EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR RELATIVE PRICES 
Semi-logarithmic scale 
1. Population of Latin America. 
2. United States imports from Latin America. 
3. Real income of the United States. 
4. Terms of trade of Latin America with the United States. 
5. Latin America's capacity to import from the United States. 
Sowùe: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. 
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Looking at the curves of this chart, we see that during the past twenty-
five years, the fluctuation of real income in the United States has been 
the dominant factor in the rise and fall of imports from Latin America. 
This correlation is not absolute, since in the 19'30's imports fluctuated 
more sharply than income, and over the whole period they reveal minor 
fluctuations which do not follow the movement of income. There is, 
however, a definite connexion between these factors which seems to 
indicate that the fluctuations of income outweigh those of other factors in 
their influence upon the volume of imports.1 
By multiplying the index of the quantum of United States imports, 
mentioned above, by the terms of trade, we obtain a corresponding index 
of the capacity of Latin America to import, as a function of the quantum 
of its exports to the United States and the terms of trade. This new 
index is represented by curve 5 of the aforesaid chart. 
In order to calculate the terms of trade, a special index was first com-
puted based upon the prices of the fourteen principal Latin-American 
commodities imported by the United States; this index was then divided 
by United States export prices of finished manufactures. These data are 
all indicated on the above-mentioned chart. 
Let us now see what conclusions can be drawn from these indices. 
It should be especially noted that during the 1930's the quantum of 
Latin-American products imported by the United States decreased remark-
ably in relation to the five-year period, 1925-29, prior to the great world 
crisis, whereas population continued to increase at the same rate as 
Table 3 B 
REAL INCOME OF THE UNITED STATES, IN RELATION TO ITS IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE LATTER'S CAPACITY TO IMPORT AS A FUNCTION OF ITS EXPORTS 
TO THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR RELATIVE PRICES 
(Percentage of variation as compared with the 1925-29 yearly average) 
Coefficient Terms of Latin 
United of United trade of America's 
Real in- States States Latin capacity 
come of imports imports America to import 
the from from Price indices with the from the 
United Latin Latin United United 
Years States America America Exports Imports States States 
1930-34 - 11.2 - 28.3 - 42.S - 40.7 - 28.2 - 17.8 - 40.8 
1935-39 - 0.3 7.4 - 39.6 - 43.6 - 29.0 - 20.8 - 26.3 
1940-44 65.0 73.0 - 35.1 - 37.1 - 1.2 - 36.1 10.4 
1945-49 73.3 77.9 - 20.9 18.1 28.2 - 8.6 59.5 
1949 70.3 60.2 - 18.7 44.4 32.0 9.1 75.6 
Note: For source and notes, see table 3 A. 
1
 It would be interesting, nevertheless, to study each commodity separately, in order 
to observe the effect of higher customs tariffs and other restrictive measures which are 
known to have exerted a considerable influence in some cases. The consequences of 
restrictions formerly applied to some goods may possibly have been neutralized by the 
increased importation of other articles, especially during the 1940's under the pressure 
of war and post-war demand. 
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before. The capacity to import suffered an even greater reduction owing 
to the deterioration of the terms of trade, as can be seen from table 3 B. 
During the 1940's imports rapidly made up the ground they had lost 
and surpassed the growth of the population. But the capacity to import 
did not improve to the same extent. Whereas in the five-year period 
1940-44, the index of imports reached 173 and that of population 130.8 
in relation to the 1925-29 level, the index of the capacity to import rose 
only to 110.4, the index of the terms of trade having reached its lowest 
point, 63.9, during that five-year period. However, in the following period, 
1945-49, the index of the terms of trade rose to 91.4, whilst that of 
export rose to 177.9. Consequently the index of the capacity to import 
was raised to 159.5 and for the first time in the whole twenty-five years 
was higher than the growth of population. 
3. UNITED KINGDOM IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA 
We shall now consider the trend of British imports of Latin-American 
goods. For this purpose, chart 3 and table 4 A have been drawn up along 
the same lines as those relating to the United States. 
It will be seen at once that the close connexion between real income 
and imports from Latin America existing in the United States does not 
hold true in the case of Great Britain. 
On the contrary, there is a notable dissimilarity between the two 
curves. Thus, while real income in Great Britain rose from 100 in 1925-29 
to 136.3 in 1945-49, the index of goods imported from Latin America fell 
to 76.2. It is not surprising, therefore, that the index of Latin America's 
total exports, as indicated at the beginning of this chapter, did not rise 
at the same rate as the population during the past twenty-five years. The 
increased exports to the United States were not sufficient to offset the 
reduction of exports to other countries, among which Great Britain is, 
of course, one of the most important. 
It is likely that the import restrictions imposed by Great Britain as a 
result of the world economic crisis were the determining cause of the 
great difference between the country's income and imports during the 
1930's. To their influence were added those of the wartime restrictions 
and the post-war disequilibrium. 
It should be pointed out, incidentally, that these restrictions similarly 
affected imports not only from Latin America but also from other coun-
tries. Great Britain, in order to pursue its natural development after 
the great depression, was compelled to lower its import coefficient, since 
it obviously could not have afforded to maintain imports at such a high 
level in proportion to its income in the face of a sharply diminished 
power to expand exports. 
This chart also shows Latin America's capacity to import. As before, 
the corresponding index has been obtained by multiplying the index of 
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Chart 3 
REAL I N C O M E OF T H E U N I T E D KINGDOM I N RELATION TO ITS IMPORTS 
FROM LATIN AMERICA AND T H E L A T T E R ' S CAPACITY TO IMPORT AS A F U N C -
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1. Population of Latin America. 
2. Real income of the United Kingdom. 
3. Imports from Latin America. 
4. Terms of trade of the United Kingdom. 
5. Latin America's capacity to import from the United Kingdom. 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. 
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Table 4 A 
REAL INCOME OF THE UNITED KINGDOM IN RELATION TO ITS IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE L A T T E R ' S CAPACITY TO IMPORT AS A FUNCTION OF ITS 


















































































































































































































Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. 
Note: The basic data for the calculation of income and imports are taken from: 
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society ; Statistical Yearbook, United Nations ; The 
Statesman's Yearbook and Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the United 
Kingdom. 
The price indices, by means of which the terms of trade are determined, correspond 
to figures supplied by the United Kingdom Board of Trade and Schlote in "Entvuicklung 
und Strukturwandlungen des englischen Aussenhandels von 1700 bis sur Gegenwart", 
the figures for exports being based on the indices of finished products and for imports 
on the average indices for foodstuffs and raw materials. 
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Table 4 B 
REAL INCOME OF T H E UNITED KINGDOM I N RELATION TO ITS IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA 
AND T H E L A T T E R ' S CAPACITY TO IMPORT AS A FUNCTION OF ITS 
EXPORTS AND THEIR RELATIVE PRICES 
(Percentage of variation as compared with the 1925-29 average) 
Years 
1930-34 . . . 
1935-39 . . . 
1940-44 . .. 















































Note: For sources and notes, see table 4 A. 
a
 1935-38 average. 
* 1945-48 average. 
c
 1948. 
the quantum of imports by that of the terms of trade with the United 
Kingdom. As already explained, this index does not alter the conclusions 
arrived at regarding the relations between British imports from Latin 
America and the growth of the population in the latter area. It merely 
serves to emphasize the disparities already pointed out. 
4. T H E TERMS OF TRADE AND IMPORT COEFFICIENT 
In section 2 of the present chapter, we stated that the fluctuations of 
real income in the United States seem to constitute the dominant factor 
in the fluctuations of that country's imports of Latin-American goods. 
More conclusive proof than that apparent from the curves of chart 2 is 
furnished by chart 5, where the relationship between the two factors is 
shown and the coefficient of correlation has been calculated. The coeffi-
cient obtained is 0.94, and the relationship may be considered satisfactory. 
That this coefficient does not equal unity means that other factors 
also influence the fluctuation of imports. It might be surmised that the 
terms of trade are to a certain extent responsible. If, in fact, the import 
prices of Latin-American goods decrease in relation to export prices of 
goods manufactured in the United States, that is to say, if the terms of 
trade improve for the United States, it would be reasonable to expect that 
such imports would thereby be stimulated. However, statistical analysis 
does not indicate a satisfactory correlation between the fluctuations of 
imports and the terms of trade. This is evident from the wide dispersal 
of points on chart 6, which shows the relationship between the two 
factors. Furthermore, the coefficient of correlation is a mere 0.43, which 
is far too low to be considered of any decisive significance. 
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This does not mean that the terms of trade have no influence at all on 
imports, but only that their influence in any case would be far less 
marked and perceptible than that of real income. The influence of the 
terms of trade is felt rather in the share of monetary income which the 
United States spends on the importation of Latin-American goods, as is 
shown in table 3 B. 
It should be noted that in the 1930's, imports of Latin-American goods 
by the United States fell more sharply than that country's real income, 
despite the fact that the terms of trade improved noticeably for the United 
States in relation to the five-year period 1925-29. The net result of this 
improvement was that the latter country was able to acquire goods from 
Latin America with a much smaller proportion of its money income than 
previously, as can be seen from the marked decrease in the import co-
efficient. On the other hand, during the first five years of the 1940's, 
imports increased once more, and at a greater rate than real income. This 
could be attributed to the further improvement in the terms of trade, which 
then touched their highest level of the whole quarter-century. Had there 
Table 5 A 
TERMS OF TRADE AND TOTAL IMPORT COEFFICIENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Year 
Terms of Total 
trade import 
(Base: 1937=100) coefficient Year 
Terms of Total 
trade import 





































































































































Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. 
Note: The terms of trade have been calculated from the Latin-American viewpoint ; 
accordingly they are the quotient obtained by dividing the index prices of imports by 
that of exports, not vice versa. 
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been such a price influence, its effect would not in any case have been 
felt during the following five-year period, since the terms of trade 
deteriorated considerably for the United States, yet its imports increased 
again, at an equal pace with real income. 
In any case, it is a fact that in both five-year periods, as a consequence 
of Latin America's unfavourable terms of trade, its export coefficient to 
the United States was maintained at an extremely low level. 
An examination of the British statistics brings us to the same con-
clusions. By contrast, concurrently with the deterioration of Latin Amer-
ica's terms of trade, there appear other phenomena which sharpen the 
Chart 4 
RELATION BETWEEN THE TERMS OF TRADE AND THE COEFFICIENTS OF 
IMPORTS INTO THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Semi-logarithmic scale 
1. Terms of trade of the United States. 
2. Total import coefficient of the United States. 
3. Terms of trade of the United Kingdom. 
4. Total import coefficient of the United Kingdom. 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. 
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decrease of the coefficient of imports from Latin America. A summary 
of the five-yearly statistics is given in table 4 B. 
The phenomenon which we have described is certainly not limited to 
imports of Latin-American goods. On the contrary, it is even more noticeable 
in the total imports of the United States, for since these imports cover 
a greater variety of goods the individual factors which affect the small 
number of Latin-American export commodities do not make themselves 
felt to the same degree. 
Table 5 B 

























Percentages of variation as compared 
with 192}-29 yearly average 
Terms of 
Years trade 
5.82 1930-34 - 19.6 
3.40 1935-39 - 22.0 
3.66 1940-44 - 22.7 
2.66 1945-49 - 13.2 
3.00 1949 - 5.2 
3.14 
ns Economic Commission for Latin America. 








Chart 4 and its corresponding table (5 A) , make this quite evident. 
The terms of trade of the rest of the world with the United States are 
shown on curve 1, while curve 2 represents the total volume of goods 
imported by that country. Note the close relationship between the curves ; 
the trend of the terms of trade which was unfavourable to the rest of the 
world during the great economic crisis; its subsequent brief improvement 
until 1937, followed by a further deterioration lasting until the end of the 
1930's ; finally, an improvement in the 1940's—all these movements 
strongly affect the coefficient of imports. It will be seen, however, that 
whereas during the latter part of the 1940's the terms of trade tended 
to resume the position they had held before the world crisis, the coefficient 
of total imports has tended to fall persistently. Consequently, during the 
five-year period 1945-49 the terms of trade only fell 13.2 per cent in 
relation to the 1925-29 level, whereas the import coefficient of total 
imports fell 49.3 per cent in the same period. Table 5 B presents a sum-
mary of the figures for the last twenty-five years. 
A similar phenomenon can be observed in connexion with Great Britain, 
over a longer period of time, on the above-mentioned chart. The period 
falls clearly into two separate phases. The first lasts until the First World 
War (1914-18) when Great Britain ceased to be the principal cyclical 
centre. The second phase dates from then until the present time and shows 
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Chart 5 
UNITED STATES : RELATION BETWEEN NATIONAL INCOME AND IMPORTS FROM 
LATIN AMERICA 
y = Quantum of United States imports from Latin America. 
x = United States real national income. 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. 
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Chart 6 
UNITED STATES: RELATION BETWEEN THE TERMS OF TRADE WITH LATIN 






a . 39.431 
t «0.4I68 
• 1 4 
SO T5Õ" 100 200 
y •= Quantum of United States imports from Latin America. 
x = United States terms of trade with Latin America. 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. 
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coefficient, as did their subsequent improvement. The same thing occurs 
during later fluctuations. The movement generally is more marked in the 
import coefficient, though this is, of course, also affected by other factors, 
including the import restrictions which were imposed after the world 
economic crisis and to which other restrictions were later added during the 
Second World War. The average British import coefficient for the period 
1945-48 was 17.7 per cent, whereas in 1900-09, it had been 31 per cent. 
This meant a decrease of 43 per cent, which undoubtedly contributed 
to a considerable extent to the deterioration by 29.5 per cent of United 
Kingdom's terms of trade during that period. Table 6 B presents a sum-
mary of the figures given in table 6 A. 
Table 6 B 
TERMS OF TRADE AND TOTAL IMPORT COEFFICIENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Five-year averages 
Terms of Coefficient of 
Years trade total imports 
1925-29 110.5 30.46 
1930-34 92.7 21.29 
1935-39 98.5 19.43 
1940-44 96.3 16.02 • 
1945-49 100.4 17.67" 
1949 106.9 21.27" 
Note: For sources and notes, see table 6 A. 
" 1945-48 average. 
" 1948. 
Years 
Percentages of variation on the 





1930-34 - 16.1 - 30.1 
1935-39 - 10.8 - 36.2 
1940-44 - 12.9 - 47.4 
1945-49 - 9.2 - 42.0* 
1949 - 3.3 - 30.2" 
5. READJUSTMENT OF THE IMPORT COEFFICIENT IN LATIN AMERICA 
As shown above, the coefficient for total United States imports during 
the last five-year period was reduced by 46 per cent, which brings it 
down to almost half the level prior to the world crisis, whereas the 
coefficient for goods imported from Latin America was reduced by 
18.7 per cent. This does not imply that Latin America's position in inter-
national trade was any more favourable during the past twenty-five years. 
Even though the direct effect of the reduction of the United States import 
coefficient was less intense with respect to Latin America than to the 
rest of the world, the indirect effect of its fall was equally serious, since 
other countries, finding their exports to the United States restricted, 
were also compelled to restrict imports from Latin America, as has just 
been shown in the case of Great Britain. 
These events obliged Latin America to readjust its import coefficient 
in order to be able, during the great depression, to mitigate the effects 
of the decline in its exports and their prices on real income and also to 
enable it to continue to develop despite its seriously shrunken capacity to 
import. 
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Thanks to these readjustments, the Latin-American countries in general 
had been able to check the disequilibrium of their balances of payments 
by the beginning of the Second World War. This fact, together with the 
vast monetary reserves accumulated as a result of the difficulties of 
importing during the war, perhaps gave the impression that the problem 
of disequilibrium had been definitively solved. 
However, if one keeps in mind that the persistent tendency towards 
disequilibrium is, in the final analysis, a result of economic evolution, 
as was shown in chapter I, it is not surprising that most countries, once 
they had spent a great part of these reserves, found themselves faced with 
new problems of disequilibrium as acute as those of the 1930's. Such 
problems will arise whenever the capacity to import does not increase 
together with real income. Moreover, when once an adjustment has been 
made which corrects the tendency towards disequilibrium, it will be found 
that the tendency will reappear in time if the capacity to import does not 
increase proportionately with real income.2 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Two fundamental conclusions emerge from our analysis. The first is 
that the deterioration of the terms of trade has been one of the primary 
factors contributing to the decrease in the import coefficients of the United 
States and Great Britain, with serious repercussions on the economic 
development of the Latin-American countries and of the rest of the 
world, which caused them to reduce their own import coefficient to the 
detriment of their international trade. Secondly, if because of a decrease 
in national income or because of the imposition of any sort of restriction, 
imports into the United States and Great Britain are reduced, the conse-
quent relative fall of import prices does not seem to cause imports to 
rise again. Rather, this fall of prices is simply a means of enabling the 
centres to acquire their imports with a smaller proportion of their money 
income. 
It therefore does not seem that Latin America, considered as a whole, 
can increase its import capacity to any extent by increasing its exports 
to the great centres beyond the limits set by the increase of real income 
in these centres and by the restrictions hampering Latin-American exports. 
To try to exceed such limits would, in fact, be forcing imports to the 
2
 Obviously, in many cases inflation has aggravated disequilibrium, but inflation is 
generally associated with phenomena of growth. So far as inflation is used to obtain 
the resources required to provide the necessary capital and part of such resources are 
set aside for the importation of capital goods, the resultant disequilibrium is typical 
of economic development. But so far as inflation leads to an increase in the income 
of the social classes which it favours and this increase expands imports, to that extent 
the resultant disequilibrium is not characteristic of economic development but simply 
an inflationary manifestation. It is evident that the frequent occurrence of these in-
flationary phases in Latin America is not sufficient to allow one to attribute the dis-
equilibrium of the balances of payments exclusively to inflation, or to ignore the 
fundamental factors which cause disequilibrium in the absence of inflation. 
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detriment of the terms of trade without leading to any substantial increase 
in the volume of exports. 
If instead of observing Latin America as a whole, we consider the 
case of a single country, it is conceivable that a fall in the price of one 
product would eliminate other Latin-American producers from the market ; 
but we are not concerned with this problem. It might also be possible 
that in the case of certain products, as has in fact actually occurred, 
Latin-American exports to the United States could be increased by taking 
advantage of special circumstances prevailing in the market. But as 
imports in the United States are to a great extent a function of real 
income, it is difficult to see how such imports could attain any importance 
in trade as a whole, independently of real income, except when vital 
changes take place in demand or when the present difficulties are attenuated 
or eliminated.3 
7. SENSITIVITY OF THE PRINCIPAL CENTRE TO EXTERNAL INFLUENCES 
The marked decline in the United States import coefficient during the 
world economic crisis caused the effects of this depression to be felt even 
more acutely in the rest of the world. Countries were obliged to reduce 
their imports from the United States, besides curtailing trade with one 
another. Consequently, the decline of the import coefficient was accom-
panied by a similar drop in the export coefficient of the United States. 
The former decreased from 5.82 per cent in 1925-29 to 3.40 per cent in 
1930-34, while the latter fell from 6.69 per cent to 4.14 per cent during 
the same period. Despite the changes brought about by war, both coeffi-
cients remained at relatively low levels, namely 2.95 per cent for the 
former and 5.27 for the latter in 1945-49, in comparison with the high 
coefficients maintained by Great Britain before it ceased to be the principal 
cyclical centre, for, in the period 1870-1914 Great Britain's import c o -
efficient averaged 32.1 per cent and its export coefficient 18.9 per cent. 
This disparity is of great importance to world economy, since it is of 
considerable influence in determining how the principal cyclical centre 
functions and affects its relations with other countries. It affects both 
the centre's capacity to transmit to other centres and to the periphery 
its impulses of expansion and contraction and the effects upon the centre 
of the impulses transmitted to it by the rest of the world. We will not 
3
 There are also cases where exports do not increase sufficiently owing to the 
weakening of the capacity to export, either because the productive potential of the 
country has been improperly applied or because the increase in domestic consumption 
has been achieved at the expense of exports. Moreover, this increase in domestic con-
sumption may derive from an increase in real per capita income, due to increased 
productivity, or, again, it may be due to inflationary disturbances in the distribution 
of income. To what extent may such examples lead us to believe that the decrease in 
Latin America's capacity to import is the result of a decrease in its capacity to export ? 
It is impossible to answer this question satisfactorily without examining what has 
occurred in the case of the leading items of exports. However, the fact that a country 
could have exported more does not mean that the great industrial centres would have 
extended their capacity to import nor that it has occurred to the detriment of the 
terms of trade. 
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deal with the former, since it is beyond the scope of this report, but 
rather study the effects of external impulses upon the cyclical centre and 
the way in which this centre passes it on or retransmits it to the rest of the 
world. 
It is evident that the greater the export coefficient, the greater will be 
the influence of the fluctuations in exports upon the national income. 
Hence, when Great Britain was the principal cyclical centre, its exports, 
representing as they did a high percentage of the country's total income, 
fulfilled a dynamic function similar to that of capital investment. Thus, 
should the cyclical upswing be initiated elsewhere than in Great Britain, 
or develop there more intensely than in Great Britain, the increased 
income in the other centre and the extension of this phenomena to other 
countries would react favourably on British exports. This increase in 
British exports would, in turn, be quick to stimulate domestic activity 
and hence to produce an increase in the total income of Great Britain, 
owing to the effect of the increase on consumption as well as on the 
investment of capital first in the export industries and thereafter in other 
industries. On the other hand, since in the United States exports com-
prise a much smaller proportion of the national income, as a dynamic 
element they are not comparable to capital investment, which, as we all 
know, is of decisive influence in economic activity. Consequently, if capital 
investments in the United States were scarce, there is little likelihood 
that increased exports would be able to act as a dynamic factor affecting 
domestic activity, at least with sufficient vigour to make up for the 
deficiency of investments. 
However, the British centre was not only more sensitive to external 
impetus than the United States, but also its capacity to return an external 
impetus was much greater, a fact chiefly due to the difference in magni-
tude of the respective import coefficients. 
8. T I M E AND INTENSITY REQUIRED BY CENTRE TO RETRANSMIT EXTERNAL 
IMPULSES 
Every country, whether great or small, whether its import coefficient 
be large or small, tends to pass on any impulses received from abroad. 
However, the time and the intensity with which it does so are of the 
greatest practical importance. The time factor has not yet been ascribed 
all the importance it merits in dynamic economics, and in order to illus-
trate this importance, we offer the following simple hypothetical example. 
Let us take two countries, A and B, where there is not full employment 
and the exports of which increase by 100; this represents a constant and 
continuous rate of increase which augments the real and monetary incomes 
of their respective countries, in each consecutive circulatory period. In A, 
the import coefficient equals 25 per cent, while in B it is only 5 per cent. 
In both cases, the duration of the circulatory period is six months. The 
circulatory process of such increments is well known and needs no more 
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than passing reference. In the first phase, a part of the first increment 
is absorbed by imports and the remainder flows into the internal economic 
system. The second increment is added to the remainder of the first 
increment; a part of the sum of these two is canalized into imports and 
the remainder flows into the third period, and so> on, ad infinitum. 
In this way, income is gradually increased by an accumulative process, 
imports increasing proportionately, given a stable coefficient. A point is 
reached where the income so accumulated has increased to such an extent 
that the amount absorbed by imports will equal the periodic increments 
of 100 of exports. It is obvious that the lower the import coefficient, the 
longer it will take to achieve equality between the periodic increase of 
exports and the increase which in time occurs in imports. The figures in 
table 7 have been computed to clarify the problem : 
Table 7 
NUMBER OF CIRCULATORY PERIODS REQUIRED FOR IMPORTS TO REACH A SPECIFIED 
PERCENTAGE OF THE INCREASE IN EXPORTS, ACCORDING TO THE DIFFERENT 
VALUES OF THE IMPORT COEFFICIENT 
Import coefficient 
Rath of 
'imports'to ° - 3 0 ° - 2 S ° - 2 0 ° - 1 S ° - 1 0 ° - 0 S 
increase in exports 
Circulatory periods 
0.50 ~L94 2A1 Ï Ï Ï 426 6Ü7 ÎÏSÏ 
0.75 3.89 4.82 6.21 8.S3 13.15 27.02 
0.90 6.46 8.01 10.32 14.16 14.16 44.88 
0.95 8.40 10.42 13.43 18.42 28.43 58.30 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. 
In country A, where the import coefficient is 25 per cent, by the end 
of 2.41 cyclical periods, i.e., in a little more than twelve months, imports 
will already have reached 50 per cent of the periodic increase of exports; 
whereas in country B, the import coefficient of which is only 5 per cent, 
it will take 13.51 periods, in other words, six and one-half years to 
obtain the same results. In the same way, in order that imports should 
reach 95 per cent of the periodic increase of exports, in other words, 
practically equal them, country A would require a period of five years 
whereas in B more than a quarter of a century would be needed. 
As a matter of fact, events do not follow rigorously the mechanical 
pattern set forth here; and as regards the accumulative increase of 
income, not only must we consider the income springing from the periodic 
increase of exports but also income deriving from increased production 
as a result of a general increase of demand. Furthermore, though imports 
tend to expand, as has been shown here, they do not reach parity with 
exports, since certain forces come into play which bring about the charac-
teristic rise and fall in the process of growth. However, the figures given 
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above, as a first approach to a study of: the problem, give some notion 
of the way the time factor operates. 
9. PERIOD OF TRANSMISSION AND DISEQUILIBRIUM 
All other factors being equal, the lower the import coefficient, the lower 
a centre's capacity to transmit the impulses received. It is clear that in 
time, whatever the import coefficient, it will transmit the impulses received 
in their entirety. But whether this occurs in a short period or over a 
much longer one has a decisive influence in each concrete case. 
Indeed, while imports into the centre do not equal exports, the rest 
of the world will be in a constantly unbalanced state, in which it is com-
pelled to release a part of its gold reserves, this portion increasing in 
direct ratio to the original impulse received by the centre, while trans-
mission of the effects of such impulse back to the rest of the world, whence 
it originated, will be proportionately slower. 
The above analysis is the necessary basis to enable us to inquire if the 
tendency to disequilibrium resulting from the economic development of 
Latin America might conceivably generate in the world economic system 
forces which would run counter to this trend and eventually restore 
equilibrium. There are two aspects of this problem which will be dealt 
with successively. 
If Latin America constantly bought more from than it sold to the 
United States (without reference to other items of the balance of pay-
ments) it is conceivable that, after some time, exports to the United 
States would approach the level of imports owing to the effect which such 
an increase would have had upon that country, as has just been shown. 
In the meantime, however, the disequilibrium would have provoked serious 
monetary difficulties in Latin America. 
Nor is that all. Economic development, whilst the process runs its 
course, does not suffer from a single period of unbalance but rather, from 
a series of such periods. Thus, whilst forces would slowly be brought into 
play to correct .the first one, another would arise immediately and be 
added to the first, and so on. Ultimately the loss of reserves would become 
so great that economic development must either be reduced or halted, or 
else, if economic development is to continue, import coefficients must be 
progressively lowered. 
The classical theory regarding the balance of payments and the inter-
national movement of gold had the merit of perceiving the forces actually 
at work. But whether in its primitive and archaic form, or in the more 
recent adaptations of the formula, the theory has always tended to limit 
itself to the static, merely registering the fact that each disturbance repre-
sents transition from one period of equilibrium to another, without attrib-
uting any significance to the duration of such a transitional period. Thus 
focused, the theory could not be satisfactorily applied to problems of 
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economic development, since in such a process, disturbances follow one 
another closely and their duration is of outstanding importance. 
That this inability of the theory to explain a dynamic process should 
not have been noticeable when Great Britain acted as the principal cyclical 
centre is easy to understand, for, as has been seen, the function of exports 
in the economic life of the country and its high import coefficient rendered 
it highly sensitive to any external stimuli and these were therefore re-
turned to the rest of the world relatively quickly. Therefore, in the subse-
quent development of other great industrial Powers, there was no manifest 
tendency to a chronic unfavourable balance. There are various contribu-
tory factors, the complexity and interdependence of which must not be 
overlooked; nevertheless, it is obvious that the activity of the British 
centre exercised a very strong influence at the time. In fact, those coun-
tries whose economic development followed that of Great Britain were 
able to expand their exports successively, as the increase of their income 
compelled them to import more. This ability to export was brought about 
by the favourable influence which imports from these countries exercised 
on the British centre's national income, and because by virtue of its high 
import coefficient this centre was able to return the stimulus received with 
great intensity and in a relatively short time. 
When a country's exports are sufficient to enable it to obtain in 
exchange the imports essential to its economic progress, and when its 
export capacity can be constantly augmented in harmony with its develop-
ment, it is relatively simple to counteract the tendency towards disequilib-
rium which such development generally entails. Such was the case in the 
past. The British market, unhampered by any restriction, was free to 
import all that was offered from abroad on favourable terms of competi-
tion, whether from countries beginning to develop industrially, or from 
others definitely belonging to the periphery, where the former also acquired 
their raw materials, thus strengthening the ability of the peripheral coun-
tries to buy in the larger industrial centres. Without passing judgment 
on such methods, it is useful to point out that on the whole, the phe-
nomenon under consideration gave to the principal cyclical centre an 
extraordinary capacity not only to extend to the rest of the world the 
impulses emanating from its own economy but also to assimilate such 
external impulses as reached it and return them without delay. 
10. T H E PRINCIPAL CYCLICAL CENTRE UNDER THE HYPOTHESIS OF FULL 
EMPLOYMENT 
In the foregoing analysis, it has been assumed that the increase of 
income in the cyclical centre, resulting from the expansion of its exports, 
has been effected without any difficulties, due to the existence of un-
employed factors of production. It should now be interesting to see 
whether, given full employment of these factors, the cyclical centre's 
capacity to return external stimuli would be noticeably increased. 
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It is quite easy to understand that if in these circumstances exports 
were to increase, the subsequent increase of income and demand would 
cause prices to rise,4 for if the factors of production were fully employed, 
it would not be possible to increase production for domestic consumption 
in order to meet the increased demand. The problem, therefore, is to 
know whether the rise in prices would be great enough for imports to 
increase rapidly and to the extent necessary to compensate for the increase 
in exports and so to pass on to the rest of the world the impetus received 
from it. 
A simple example will help us to find the solution. Let us take coeffi-
cients which are fairly close to those given in relation to the United 
States. We shall assume a cyclical centre which has full employment 
and during a given initial period of the trade cycle, has income equal 
to 100,000 with its exports and imports balanced, each representing 
4 per cent of the income; in the following period, exports increase from 
4,000 to 6,000 and absorb the total increase of productive factors. Thus 
there will be an increase of 2,000 in income, which in turn will increase 
domestic demand; but since production cannot be increased, its factors 
being fully employed, prices will rise by 2 per cent. In order that imports 
and exports may balance, the former must also increase from 4,000 to 
6,000, that is, by 50 per cent. It cannot be expected that a price rise of 
2 per cent would result in an increase twenty-five times higher in the 
volume of imports during the second cyclical period. However, prices will 
continue to rise in subsequent periods unless they are influenced by 
opposing factors. Actually, the rise in price which takes place during the 
second period represents increased returns for the entrepreneurs and 
part of this goes into higher wages; and if this increase in income is 
fully absorbed during the third period, the balance attained between sup-
ply and demand in the second period will be maintained, so that if we 
assume that exports again prove to be greater than imports, the export 
surplus will once again exert pressure, causing prices to rise, and so on. 
It is, therefore, conceivable that given time, a rise in internal prices may 
lead to an expansion of imports, thus tending to balance these with exports. 
In this case, as in others, the problem has been stated in simplified 
terms disregarding a number of complex factors which obtain in actual 
practice. On the one hand, the price rise depends on the proportion to 
which the increase in income is absorbed by consumption or investment ; 
on the other, this rise in prices, besides affecting export and import 
prices, also produces other effects which alter the intensity and form of 
the phenomenon. Be that as it may, the fact is that the slighter the ratio 
between exports and income the longer it will take prices to rise and 
consequently affect imports. In the meantime, the disequilibrium brought 
about by excess of purchases abroad over sales which the countries of 
the rest of the world find themselves compelled to incur, will cause them 
4
 Prices will also rise without full employment, but to a lesser degree. 
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to release part of their gold reserves. As has been previously shown, this 
unfavourable balance is not the result of a single increase in the particular 
cyclical centre's exports in relation to its imports, but of a series of 
increases, and therefore, while a readjustment is taking place in respect 
of one increase, the need arises for another readjustment, and so on ad 
infinitum. 
From the above it can be seen that when the principal cyclical centre 
reacts weakly to any external impetus and delays considerably in return-
ing it, whether the productive factors are fully employed in the centre 
or not the disequilibrium caused by economic evolution conspires against 
monetary stability in countries which are beginning to develop owing to 
the persistent tendency of the cyclical centre to attract the gold reserves 
of such countries. 
11. CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GOLD STANDARD OPERATES 
Given this marked tendency to absorb gold but not release it again to 
be redistributed to the rest of the world, it is obvious that a country's 
capacity to correct an unfavourable balance by making use of its monetary 
resources, is limited. In order to avoid exhausting these reserves it is com-
pelled to take measures which, in one way or another, tend to lower the 
import coefficient. 
The repercussion of this is visible in monetary policy. When the prin-
cipal cyclical centre's capacity to receive and return external stimuli 
allowed it to send forth the gold it accumulated, the adoption of a gold 
standard was expedient. This is no longer possible, however, since the 
cyclical centre, by reason of its economic structure, has to a great extent 
lost this capacity to transmit the gold which it attracted. 
A centre like Great Britain, which through the increase of its exports 
and foreign investments during the cyclical upswing restored a large part 
of the gold accumulated during the downswing, was bound to contribute 
greatly to the smooth working of the monetary system in other countries. 
It was not enough that the free inflow and outflow of gold should be 
permitted in accordance with the well known rules of the game. The 
centre at which gold reserves accumulated by natural gravitation had 
in turn to expel it, regularly and systematically for the reasons set out 
above. In other words, it is essential that such reserves be able to leave 
the centre again, but the mere existence of such channels does not ensure 
that the gold really does flow outward. For this there must be a constant 
stimulus from some dynamic element which will force it to leave the centre. 
The principles which were gradually being deduced from Great Brit-
ain's experience and from the improvement of its monetary and financial 
procedure did not create the facts but were rather an expression of them. 
Consequently, when the status changed radically, these principles were 
no longer fitted to serve the purpose they fulfilled before. 
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The new cyclical centre does not now possess the same power to expel 
gold. It is less sensitive to an external stimulus than was the British 
centre and far slower in transmitting it to the rest of the world by means 
of increased imports; hence the fact that the international monetary 
system works on lines very different to those followed before the First 
World War. For this and other reasons analysed elsewhere,5 gold tends 
to become concentrated in the United States; this leads to the dollar 
shortage. It should be pointed out, nevertheless, that the problem is partly 
due to European reconstruction requirements, as well as to inflation. 
These transitory factors must therefore be recognized together with the 
persistent tendency of gold to accumulate in the United States. But owing 
to the weakness of the expelling mechanism, gold tends to be retained 
in that country, thereby in turn hampering the reconstruction of the 
monetary reserves of the rest of the world. Little wonder, then, that new 
regulatory and differential measures are adopted to curb the effects of this 
phenomenon. 
Rather than being the mere effect of a particular monetary policy, 
these facts have far deeper roots. However favourable to the United States 
the credit balance of its external accounts may be, the magnitude of this 
balance is rather small in relation to the national income and the increase 
in income, accruing from the favourable balance of payments would, in 
the light of the foregoing, require considerable time before bringing about 
an increase in imports and in other items on the debit side of the balance 
of payments, sufficient, ultimately, to achieve a true balance. 
Throughout this analysis we have disregarded the exceptional circum-
stances which contributed further to the concentration of the vast gold 
reserves in the United States during the 1930's, and others leading to 
similar results in the recent past. Our sole intention was to prove the 
existence of certain constant factors conducive to an unfavourable bal-
ance which are entirely independent of any circumstantial causes which 
may intensify the tendency. Apart from these, the process of economic 
development in Latin-American and other countries of the periphery 
tends to produce persistent disequilibrium and the influences which might 
reverse this tendency operate extremely slowly, chiefly owing to the way 
in which the principal cyclical centre operates. 
12. FAILURE OF THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM 
Changes are taking place which, though frequently accompanied by 
incidental features of a temporary character, are indeed the result not of 
fortuitous events but of the fundamental changes analysed above. Of 
these, one of the outstanding is the collapse of the multilateral system. 
In the period prior to the aforesaid changes, when the gold standard 
worked with great fluidity, a given country, M, could continue to trade 
with another, N, despite a permanent deficit, purchasing more from N 
5
 See Economic Survey of Latin America 1948, United Nations, chapter 8. 
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than it sold to the latter country (because of the particular nature of 
their reciprocal trade), since N could use the gold received from M to 
purchase from the rest of the world a greater volume of goods than it, N, 
sold there. However, if N is a leading cyclical centre and does not use 
the gold it receives in this way—because its own economic structure is 
not suited for that—the gold cannot eventually flow back to M. As a 
result, the multilateral system will be seriously affected. 
It would not be surprising to find that, in these circumstances, M finds 
itself compelled to curtail its purchases from N, in order to lessen, if not 
cancel, the unfavourable balance between them, according to the volume 
of its monetary reserves or to its share in the supply of gold bullion which 
flows yearly from the mines. Since in the hypothetical case in point the 
source of the disequilibrium lies solely in N, there is no need for M to 
restrict its imports from other countries. Should it do so, the chronic 
unfavourable balance between M and N would affect not only trade 
between these two countries, but the whole chain of world commerce, 
thus reducing the classic advantages of multilateral trade. However, if 
M seeks to trade its goods, as heretofore, with the rest of the world, in 
order to continue to enjoy these advantages, it will find itself compelled 
to set up a complex system of bilateral conpensatory agreements with 
each of the principal countries with which it trades. Multilateral trade 
can, of course, continue to feature in M's economy but experience shows 
us that such a system cannot arise spontaneously once the multilateral 
compensation system—typical of the gold standard era—is broken up. 
As these lines are being written, a deliberate effort to abolish bilateralism 
has begun to be made in Europe through the Payments Union. 
Certainly, multilateralism was not characteristic of a static order of 
things but of an economic structure, whose steady development was due 
to the impulses generated by the cyclical centre. We have already seen 
how this affected the primary phase of development in Latin America. 
Let us now briefly examine the influence of multilateralism on reciprocal 
trade relations between the Latin-American countries. If, in the course of 
time, one Latin-American country bought increasingly large quantities of 
goods from another, and the latter bought from the former regardless 
of the balance of trade, this was not because the one had brought about 
an increase of purchasing power in the other, which could in turn transmit 
the impulse so received, for the volume of trade between the Latin-
American countries in general has not been sufficiently high to allow for 
such results. The explanation is rather that the increase of reciprocal 
buying was derived from the increase in Latin America's exports to the 
great industrial centres; that is to say, the former converged upon the 
latter, and through these were set up currents of trade among the Latin-
American countries themselves. 
This system could develop unhindered whilst the Latin-American coun-
tries were able to continue increasing their exports. But when, as occurred 
in the 1930's, these fell considerably, or at least did not increase at a 
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rate sufficient to meet the requirements springing from the development 
of Latin-American economy, serious difficulties began to hamper inter-
Latin-American trade. These transactions had, until then, been settled 
in gold or in other convertible currencies supplied by the industrial 
Powers. When these currencies became scarce because of the comparative 
insufficiency of Latin-American exports to the sources of convertible 
monetary resources—and it became necessary to restrict imports—such 
restrictions also affected reciprocal trade between the Latin-American 
countries. This happened even though in these same countries nothing 
had occurred which itself would have lowered consumption of the goods 
involved in such trade, at least not to the extent imposed by the restric-
tions. It thus became necessary to resort in this case, too, to bilateral 
agreements, in order either to maintain or develop reciprocal trade; this 
then is a specific example of the general consequences which we were 
previously examining. 
It has been abundantly shown, with the aid of much documentary evi-
dence, that these expedients entail serious disadvantages, especially com-
pared with the multilateral system of former days. Still, as a general rule, 
these are mere payments agreements arranged temporarily or for particu-
lar circumstances, in which there is no perceptible intention of adapting 
trade in Latin America, especially between those countries with a common 
frontier, to a permanent pattern adapted to the new conditions of world 
economy. The analysis of this will be undertaken in the following chapter. 
13. DISEQUILIBRIUM AND THE CLASSICAL THEORY 
We have thus completed the task we set ourselves at the beginning of 
the present chapter. An analysis of conditions has allowed us to show 
that Latin America's import capacity has increased less than its popula-
tion, whereas its economic development requires, on the contrary, that 
the increase of import capacity should be much greater. Secondly, we 
have seen that the tendency to a chronically unfavourable balance, deriv-
ing from the foregoing fact, cannot be corrected quickly and effectively 
because of the way in which the principal cyclical centre functions. 
The classical monetary theory solved the problem of unfavourable bal-
ances by simple means. Disequilibrium demands the export of gold re-
serves, which causes a fall in prices and lowered economic activity within 
the country until imports again reach the level of exports. The need to 
restrict economic activity in order to correct an unfavourable balance, 
would admittedly seem incompatible with the requirements of economic 
development. However, according to the same theory, in the countries 
which become depositaries of such gold reserves, certain reactions take 
place which tends to re-establish equilibrium, since the inflow of gold 
causes prices to rise with a consequent increase of imports and decrease 
of exports, and the process continues until equilibrium has once again 
been achieved. 
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From what has gone before, it is not surprising that the belief in this 
sort of automatic reaction should have prevailed until the First World 
War. Nor is it strange that doubts were voiced later with regard to the 
validity of the theory, especially after the impact of the world economic 
crisis, when the facts of the situation differed widely from the conclusions 
it put forward. 
It is possible that the confusion which still persists in regard to this 
subject is due partly to the fact that the influence of the time element 
on the actions and reactions of the cyclical centre has not been adequately 
emphasized, as we have sought to do. In concluding this chapter we 
would merely say that, until the significance and consequences of the 
material changes which have taken place in the international economy 
have been fully interpreted, it will be impossible to throw further light 
on the problems of disequilibrium and its monetary implications. 
CHAPTER III 
THE SPREAD OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND THE TERMS 
OF TRADE 
1. DYNAMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DETERIORATION OF THE TERMS OF 
TRADE 
In the preceding chapter, we sought to show that the improvement in 
the terms of trade of the great industrial countries, with the corresponding 
deterioration in the periphery, has been one of the principal factors 
responsible for the decrease of the import coefficient of the former. We 
have also pointed out the adverse influence of this phenomenon on the 
import capacity of Latin America, which had just reached a point in its 
economic development where imports tended to increase constantly. 
This relationship between the import coefficients of the great industrial 
countries and the terms of trade is no more than the statement of a fact, 
whatever interpretation one may wish to place on it. It is, however, a 
fact which is of the greatest importance to Latin America. One is there-
fore justified in devoting the present chapter to a theoretical examination 
of that fact, with a view not only to a better understanding of its nature 
but also in order to clear away some common doubts and confusion. 
This is all the more necessary since we are dealing with a phenomenon 
which is closely related to the way in which technical progress is spread 
throughout the world. From the outset, we have stated that it is not 
possible to understand the problems connected with Latin America's 
economic development without first investigating this process and its 
consequences. One of these consequences, without a doubt, is the constant 
tendency of the terms of trade to deteriorate. This phenomenon is purely 
dynamic and we hope to prove that ultimately it can be explained by the 
relative slowness of the world's industrial development to absorb the real 
or potential surplus of population gainfully employed in primary occupa-
tions. Technical progress, as we have seen, tends to decrease the amount 
of labour engaged in primary production. However, this decrease has 
been extremely slight over the years. In the meantime, new productive 
techniques are evolved which make further readjustments necessary in 
the distribution of employed population. 
Thus there is a relative abundance of potential labour in primary occu-
pations, tending constantly to exert pressure upon wages and the prices 
of primary products and preventing the periphery from sharing with the 
industrial centres the advantages of the technical progress attained by the 
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latter. Furthermore, the periphery is unable to retain a part of the benefits 
of its own technical progress. 
2. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRICE RELATIONS BETWEEN PRIMARY AND INDUS-
TRIAL GOODS 
From the outset one must be careful not to attribute to this statement 
implications which can only be understood later. Therefore, a short ex-
planatory note will be useful before going more deeply into the subject. 
If prices reflected only decreasing costs resulting from technical progress, 
then prices of manufactured goods should fall more than those of primary 
goods, since as is generally recognized, the increment of productivity is 
greater in the former than in the latter. The price relation would thus 
seem to swing in favour of primary production, and its index or that of 
its equivalent, that is, the index of the terms of trade, would consequently 
rise from say 100 to 150, if the terms of trade fell, thus indicating that 
the same amount of primary products as before could purchase 50 per 
cent more manufactured goods. Primary producers would then be able 
to share equally with the manufacturers the profits derived from technical 
progress, as they would be able to purchase larger amounts of higher 
quality goods. If despite the greater decline in the cost of manufactured 
goods, the index of the price relation were to remain at 100, it would 
mean that producers of manufactured goods would have retained for 
themselves the advantages of greater quantity and higher quality of manu-
factured goods. Should the index fall below 100, then not only would 
primary producers not have received any share from increased industrial 
productivity but they would have been unable to retain for themselves 
the full profits of their own technical progress, since they would have 
surrendered a part of it to the manufacturers. This does not mean that 
primary producers are worse off than they were before. Everything de-
pends on the degree of increased productivity reached and the extent to 
which it is transferred to industrial manufacturers. If the index falls to 
80, for instance, primary producers will be able to obtain 20 per cent 
less manufactured goods than they did before, for the same amount of 
primary goods. However, if to obtain that same amount they need work 
only half as long as before, one hour's labour would now allow them to 
purchase 60 per cent more manufactured goods, instead of 100 per cent 
more, as would have been the case had they received the full benefits 
of their own technical progress; or an even greater quantity had they 
been able to share in the benefits of technical progress achieved in the 
industrial sector, should such progress be greater than that achieved in 
the field of primary production.1 
The indices given in the preceding chapter seem to indicate that in the 
past seventy-five years something of this sort has occurred; that is to 
say, if, as is likely, technical progress in primary production at the peri-
1
 For a fuller analysis of this phenomenon, see "The economic development of Latin 
America and its principal problems" (E/CN.12/89) page 2. 
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phery had been less than that of industry at the centre, then the periphery 
will have transferred to the centre part of the benefits of its own tech-
nical progress. Unfortunately, due to the lack of data concerning the 
increment of productivity in primary production it is not possible to 
ascertain the extent of such benefits and what part of them has remained 
in the primary producer countries. We will return to this aspect of the 
question later. Meanwhile, we shall try to explain the causes of this phe-
nomenon which is so vital in the economic development of Latin America. 
3. T H E REAL OR POTENTIAL SURPLUS OF GAINFULLY EMPLOYED POPULATION 
AND THE TERMS OF TRADE 
We have already stated that a surplus of labour generally exists in 
primary production and that this excess exerts an unfavourable pressure 
on primary wages and costs. This tendency derives on the one hand from 
the relatively large increase of population in the regions of primary 
production and on the other from technical progress, which reduces the 
number of persons required to obtain the same quantity of products. The 
absorption of such a surplus in fact becomes the task of industry and 
the occupations directly or indirectly depending on the development of 
industry. 
The surplus may either be real or potential, that is to say, it may already 
have become a reality through the application of new techniques in 
primary production or occur when new methods are introduced either 
spontaneously or as a consequence of industry's labour requirements which, 
by drawing labour from primary production, cause wages to rise and 
forces an improvement in methods of production. This latter case seems 
to have occurred frequently in the United States, where industrial areas 
attract population from the peripheral zones of primary production in 
the country. A real surplus of gainfully employed population could also 
occur if technical progress in primary production was not accompanied 
by either prior or simultaneous development of industry and its related 
occupations, in which case neither would then be capable of absorbing 
the excess labour as it arises. 
In either case, if the gainfully employed population were perfectly mobile 
and did not show reluctance or deliberate opposition to migration, and 
if the rapid development of industry and its related occupations could 
immediately absorb the aforesaid real or potential excess of gainfully 
employed, then there would be a marked tendency towards a levelling 
of primary and industrial wages, even making allowance for differences 
in skill. Both would benefit from the general increment to productivity if 
instead of wages rising with the increase of productivity, prices fell 
together with costs. 
However, an examination of the situation in the world as a whole 
shows that both industry and its related occupations have developed 
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relatively slowly, so that absorption of the real or potential surplus 
of gainfully employed population in primary production has been con-
siderable in the great industrial countries; but the process is only just 
beginning in Latin America and the rest of the periphery. 
The large countries, given the present structure of the world's economy, 
limit the process to their own population. Within their frontiers, industry 
and its associated activities do not develop in such a manner as to absorb 
the population of the periphery, so that the peripheral countries have 
no means of absorbing the surplus of their gainfully employed population 
except by developing their own industrial activity. It is not possible for 
them to employ this surplus in expanding primary production since the 
distribution of the population is not arbitrary but depends on productive 
technique, as has been pointed out in chapter I. 
Consequently, the relatively slow spread of technical progress has 
weighed more heavily than the factors which tend to distribute its bene-
fits over the world, and the periphery not only has been generally unable 
to share with the industrial centres in the advantages derived from the 
technical progress in these centres but has even been compelled to cede 
to them a part of the benefits deriving from its own progress, due to the 
insistent pressure of the real or potential surplus of gainfully employed 
population. 
4. DEGREE TO WHICH BENEFITS OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS ARE TRANSFERRED 
The magnitude of this cession by the periphery to the centre of a part of 
the benefits derived from technical progress in primary production is not 
uniform. On the contrary, the intensity of the movement varies in propor-
tion to the strength of two opposing forces. On the one hand, we have the 
growth of primary production and, on the other, the demand for primary 
goods in the industrial centres. Should the latter increase more than the 
former, the amount ceded decreases ; and the centres might even transfer to 
the periphery a part of the benefits of their technical progress, a phenome-
non which would become manifest in the improvement, for the periphery, of 
the terms of reciprocal trade. However, if demand in the industrial centres 
increases relatively less than primary production, or is slow to recuperate 
its powers after an acute depression, the price relation will deteriorate 
for the periphery, and the degree of its transfer to the centre will increase 
in inverse ratio to the proportional or absolute weakening of the dynamic 
industrial factor. 
There is, in fact, a dynamic element in industry which is not found to 
a comparable extent in primary production. The latter, as its name would 
imply, covers the initial phases of the productive process, while industry 
accounts for subsequent stages. Because of this relative position of the two 
activities, the increase in industrial activity stimulates primary produc-
tion, but the latter has not the power to generate industrial production. 
When industrial entrepreneurs, stimulated by the normal economic forces, 
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or by extraordinary factors in times of Avar, undertake to increase pro-
duction, demand for primary products increases; as profits are conse-
quently greater, entrepreneurs in the periphery seek to increase primary 
production. The spontaneous increase of the latter, on the other hand, 
does not cause a similar rise in industrial demand which would be capable 
of absorbing that increase, as can easily be seen from the following exam-
ple. Let us assume, exaggerating the proportions to simplify matters, that 
in a total selling price of 1,000 units for a finished product, 500 corre-
spond to the periphery and the rest represents values added during the 
various stages of the productive process corresponding to industrial 
sectors. Let it further be assumed that the periphery of its own initiative 
intends to increase its production by 10 per cent, giving its productive 
factors an added income of 50. To simplify even further, let it be assumed 
that this increase of income is entirely absorbed by the consumption of 
finished goods from the centre. It is clear that the demand for such goods 
will only increase by 5 per cent at most, whereas primary production 
will have increased by 10 per cent. There would, therefore, be no increase 
of industrial demand sufficient to absorb the increased primary production 
and the latter's terms of trade would deteriorate. In actual fact, the share 
of primary production in the value of finished goods is less than that 
given in our example and the increase in income is not absorbed entirely 
and immediately by the consumption of finished goods. In reality, the 
periphery's influence on the centre would be weaker and the consequent 
disequilibrium would be correspondingly greater. 
The foregoing affords us a better understanding of the effects of in-
creased production in the periphery deriving from either increased popu-
lation or from improved technical progress, and shows that if such an 
increase of production is not accompanied by an equivalent increase in 
the demand for primary goods in the industrial centres, the position of 
the periphery is weakened and it cannot resist the pressure of factors 
which tend to take from it the benefits of its own productivity. 
5. DYNAMIC IMPORTANCE OF INDUSTRIAL GROWTH 
From our remarks concerning the dynamic significance of industrial 
development, it may be seen that this development affects manufacturing 
in two ways : first, by what we have called demand from the centre—this 
covers both raw materials for industry and foodstuffs required by the 
centre—and secondly, by the absorption of surplus manpower from pri-
mary production. Let us now look at this second point. 
It has been shown that the centres absorb their own surpluses but not 
that of the periphery. However, they may have an indirect influence on 
the number of the gainfully employed in the periphery, through the 
demand for primary products. If industry and other activities at the centre 
develop to such an extent that they not only absorb the surplus man-
power of their own primary production but also the population which 
that production requires in order to meet the increased industrial demand, 
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then the centres would tend to import from the periphery a greater 
proportion of primary goods to meet the increase of their own require-
ments. In this way the periphery would obtain relief from the pressure 
of its surplus population and at the same time the tendency of the price 
relation to worsen would be checked. 
Phenomena of this nature must have occurred in the development of 
those countries which have now become great industrial centres. But there 
are other, better known and perhaps more important ways in which 
industrial development has functioned as a dynamic factor, absorbing 
surplus population from primary production. It is a well known fact that 
when the Industrial Revolution was in full swing in the nineteenth cen-
tury, the European population increased considerably. An increasingly 
large part of this population was absorbed by industry and other related 
occupations developing at the time, and the rest was engaged in primary 
production not only at the centre but also in the new overseas countries 
which technical progress in transport had thrown open to international 
economy, especially in the latter half of the century. Large numbers began 
to emigrate from the older regions of primary production in Europe 
(which were gradually becoming more and more industrialized) to the 
newer areas which had become either complements or substitutes in the 
production of primary goods. If we look at the phenomenon as a whole, 
however, we perceive that the proportion of persons gainfully employed 
in primary production tended to decrease whereas that in industry and 
related economic activities tended to increase. Nevertheless, the decrease 
was not sufficient to avoid a relative drop in primary prices. 
Productivity in the new lands was higher per capita than in the older 
regions, and progress in transport enabled goods from the former to 
reach the European markets easily and cheaply. It is possible that this 
increase in production, probably greater than that of demand at the centre, 
greatly influenced the deterioration of the terms of trade which occurred 
after the seventies of the last century and continued until the First 
World War. 
Then, as now, the growth of industry probably did not have sufficient 
impetus to prevent the terms of trade from turning against the periphery, 
If industry and related occupations at the centres had absorbed the popu-
lation employed in primary production more efficiently, emigration toward 
new countries would have been less and consequently they would have 
had fewer people available to increase primary production; thus primary 
production would have been in a more favourable position vis-à-vis demand 
from the centre. 
A good deal of this will remain conjectural until further research has 
been undertaken. Nor should we forget that, in the case of some primary 
goods at least, the increase of productivity indirectly attained when the 
new countries were opened to world trade by technical progress in trans-
port, may possibly have been greater than that attained by certain indus-
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trial sectors. This would not, of course, invalidate the analysis contained 
in this chapter since, if a part of the benefits of technical progress in 
primary production in the periphery is transferred to the industrial centres, 
both when the increase of productivity in primary occupations is greater 
than in industry and when the increase is less, the reason is probably 
that the real or potential surplus of gainfully employed population engaged 
in primary production exerts a persistent pressure on wages and prices. 
Not all the countries then opened up to the international economy were 
predominantly exploited by immigrant labour from the older regions of 
Europe. In the Latin-American countries with old settled populations that 
had come to live there before or after the Spanish Conquest, there is 
more than ample potential labour to work the land, whether in agriculture 
or mining. For this and other reasons, these countries do not attract 
immigrants from Europe, or at least not to the same extent as other 
countries. This fact cannot be overlooked in a study of the variations in 
the terms of trade of the various primary products, according to the 
latter's peculiar nature, the type of production and the degree of technical 
progress. Yet we must disregard it in this summary explanation, which 
for the moment has no other purpose than to clarify certain fundamental 
ideas for a better understanding of the problem of terms of trade. 
The period during which the new lands were opened up on a large scale 
in Latin America may be taken as ending somewhere between the First 
World War and the Great Depression. There are remarkable contrasts 
between this period and those following. During the latter the deteriora-
tion of the terms of trade was much more pronounced than before, since 
the marked deterioration during the First World War was followed by 
that caused by the depression. There is not only a transfer to the centre 
of the benefits accruing from technical progress in transport and other 
activities which made possible the better utilization of the increased pro-
ductivity of the new lands, but also a transfer of part of the increase in 
productivity directly obtained from improved technical methods of exploi-
tation, or perhaps the whole of the increase and more, as may even have 
occurred in some cases. 
Exports, which in the previous period had generally increased more 
than the population, continued increasing but at a slower rate than the 
population; the serious consequences of this fact in conjunction with the 
adverse trend in the terms of trade have been pointed out in the preceding 
chapter. In addition, income from land, expressed in a constant monetary 
term, decreased instead of increasing. All these circumstances combine to 
place an entirely different complexion on the economic development of 
Latin America compared with the earlier development of other countries. 
The dynamic element of the large centres no longer functions as it did 
during the decade of the Great Depression and, in primary production 
the surplus population is distinctly noticeable; an imperative need is felt 
to supply the deficiency of that traditional dynamic factor by means of a 
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new one springing from the growth of domestic industry. The extension 
of technical progress in Latin America thus enters a new stage. 
6. LAND RENT AND WAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIPHERY 
In this first analysis of the terms of trade, it can be stated that in Latin 
America the export industries to which these terms relate have, as a 
general rule, kept wages at a fairly low level compared with wages at 
the centres, even in cases where there has been an appreciable increase 
of productivity. We should not forget, however, that there have always 
been marked differences from country to country and that in recent times, 
increases have been achieved where the organization of labour and other 
favourable factors made them possible, as will be shown in another 
chapter. A number of factors account for such differences between the 
wage levels, among these the extent to which the industrial development 
of each country has progressively absorbed the surplus population and 
tended to raise wages relatively when competitive conditions in the inter-
national sphere allowed. 
The fact that wages have remained at comparatively low levels during 
the primary development of the Latin-American periphery does not mean 
that technical progress has not been able to increase other sources of 
income considerably. In those areas which are opened up to agricultural 
or mining exploitation, a sharp increase has occurred in land rent, whereby 
the value of the land itself, previously worth little or practically nothing, 
was greatly enhanced. The rent of the economically new lands is, in the 
last analysis, the expression of their greater productivity as compared with 
the older lands. Technical progress in transport is largely responsible for 
this increase of land rent. A part of the benefits derived from this progress 
remains in the hands of the landowners whilst another part flows into 
the industrial centres, by means of a relative lowering of prices. 
The social and economic repercussions of this fact are indeed vast, as 
increasing returns from the soil impart a very special form to the pene-
tration of capitalist technique in the export industries of the peripheral 
countries. 
The relatively low level of wages in primary production was therefore 
compatible with the high increase in land rent, to the advantage of certain 
social classes. 
Thus we find considerable sources of income springing up during the 
primary development of certain countries in which more advanced forms 
of economic development may later thrive, whereas in other countries, 
even though land rent also greatly increases, an appreciable part of the 
increase flows into the industrial centres, especially in the development 
of certain mining enterprises. 
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7. TERMS OF TRADE IN THIS NEW STAGE OF EXTENSION OF TECHNICAL 
PROGRESS 
It was shown in the first chapter that technical progress had been pre-
dominant in Latin America's primary export activities, though with vary-
ing intensity. There is still much room for technical improvement in these 
occupations. But if present economic conditions continue, it is possible 
that these improvements would not guarantee the permanent raising of 
the wage levels. On the contrary, wages might even be lowered and a 
large part of the profits derived from technical progress lost, if the sur-
plus population created by these very improvements cannot simultaneously 
be absorbed into industry and its associated occupations. 
Still, the periphery is immense and the population which will have to be 
absorbed by its industry and associated occupations as modern technique 
expands is also large. If a country determined to raise its wage levels 
by increasing the productivity of its export occupations and absorbing into 
industry the surplus of gainfully employed population accruing there-
from, it might be seriously hindered by other countries, also engaged 
in improving their techniques, but making no effort to raise the very low 
level of their wages. 
This might be the case for areas which are at present engaged in a 
process of primary development similar to that which occurred about 
the middle of the last century in the Latin-American periphery. In these 
areas there is no industrial development to absorb the surplus population 
and this lack may contribute to the maintenance of low wage levels. This 
is one of Latin America's most serious problems, especially owing to its 
influence on the phenomenon described above, which occurs in the terms 
of trade of certain outstanding products. 
The same thing does not occur in the case of primary production for 
domestic consumption in these same countries where, in general, little 
technical progress has been introduced, as compared with export indus-
tries. It is obvious that if the surplus of gainfully employed cannot be 
absorbed there, prices will drop as productivity rises, to the advantage 
of other social groups. But in this case the phenomenon can be counter-
acted by the development of industry and its related occupations, ensuring 
that primary producers obtain all the benefits deriving from technical 
progress without interference from competitor countries. 
Nevertheless, even in the case where the benefits of technical progress 
in export industries flow abroad, a net increase of income would be pos-
sible by employing in industry and its associated occupations the surplus 
of labour created by technical progress in primary production. In other 
words, despite the possible deterioration of the terms of trade, the peri-
pheral countries can obtain for themselves the full benefits accruing from 
technical progress in primary production for the domestic market, as 
well as from technical progress in industry, as applied to the surplus gain-
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fully employed population. But it is obvious that the net increase in income 
will be proportionately greater in accordance with the country's ability 
to counteract the tendency of the terms of trade to worsen. 
8. ANOTHER FORM OF TRANSFER OF BENEFITS OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS 
At the beginning of the present chapter we cautioned against any indi-
cation, without further study, to attribute to the terms of trade any impli-
cation other than a mere statement of fact. The preceding analysis now 
permits us to study such implications, beginning with those which seem 
unacceptable. 
In the first place, let us take the ethical implications. The fact that the 
centres tend to retain the benefits derived from their own technical 
progress does not mean that they are taking possession of something 
that does not rightfully belong to them. From the ethical standpoint, 
there might be more than one justification for this procedure. However, 
this point is irrelevant to this report. Our purpose is rather to point 
out that this method of taking possession of those benefits was not en-
visaged in doctrines of great influence on certain currents of economic 
thought. According to them the benefits accruing from technical progress 
should flow equally to the whole community in the form of lower prices 
or increased incomes. This is what has, in point of fact, generally taken 
place ; but only in the industrial centres where the benefits of their tech-
nical progress remained. The same theories furthermore assumed absolute 
mobility of factors and products, and the abstract world of this assump-
tion is substantially different from the one in which we live. It would, 
therefore, be necessary to revise the theory ab initio before applying it to 
the study of problems of economic development in the periphery. If the 
world division of labour had been effected according to this theory the 
distribution of economic activities throughout the world would perhaps 
have been very different from what it is today and the problems presented 
by the differences in the rate of increase of productivity and income which 
so profoundly affect the world economy would not have assumed their 
present proportions. The difficulties would have been of another kind, 
perhaps far more serious than those with which we are now faced. 
This same difference between the abstract world of absolute mobility 
and of levelling tendencies, on the one hand, and the complex reality of 
the present economic organization, on the other, makes easy comparison 
impossible between results which, in given circumstances, would corre-
spond to that theory and those which are, in fact, observed. 
It might be argued that, if the centres did not retain the benefits of 
their own technical progress, every peripheral country would be able to 
attain far higher terms of trade than at present and its income level 
would approach that of the centres. But it might similarly be contended 
that the peripheral countries derive a lower income than that of the cen-
tres from their export industries because their productivity is lower. 
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According to the above-mentioned theory no country, region or industry 
could maintain itself in a state of absolute mobility of the factors of pro-
duction if its technique were inferior to that of other countries, regions 
or industries, since it would no longer be able to export and its factors 
of production would be transferred to other countries, or else to other 
regions or industries in that same country. 
Furthermore, according to the same theory, if the benefits derived 
from technical progress flow from one party to another, similarly benefits 
derived from great productivity in the latter must flow towards the 
former. There is reciprocity in this movement and in no case could the 
transfer be a premium on inefficiency in production. 
Since the theory must not be applied only in part, we will do no more 
than keep it in mind as an aid to understanding the differences between 
the facts and its assumptions in order to acquire wider knowledge of actual 
conditions. 
9. CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS 
The foregoing leads to a first conclusion. The theory as outlined above 
assumes reciprocity of transfer whereas, in fact, such reciprocity does not 
appear to exist. Given the dynamic changes which are constantly taking 
place in the world economy, the slight mobility of the factors of production 
and the slow development of such occupations as can absorb the surplus 
of gainfully employed persons, the periphery tends to transfer a part of 
the benefits accruing from its technical progress to the centres whilst these 
latter retain their own benefits for themselves. The more the periphery 
seeks to increase its productivity, thus aggravating the surplus of its gain-
fully employed persons, the more intense will be the transfer, other things 
remaining equal. Therefore, in order to raise the income level in primary 
production in Latin America it is not sufficient merely to increase produc-
tivity; it is also necessary to absorb the surplus of gainfully employed 
persons in expanding industry and allied occupations. 
There is also a second conclusion to be drawn in relation to the econ-
omies of developing industry. The argument demonstrates, with unim-
peachable logic, the economic advantages to be derived from a natural 
division of international labour, given perfect mobility of the factors of 
production. It is evident that, if a country obtains all the advantages of 
technical progress achieved by other countries and in return affords them 
the advantages of its own productivity, it will not obtain any additional 
advantage if, by means of protective measures, it engages in the produc-
tion of goods already produced by others. On the contrary, it can be 
proved decisively that economic losses will follow. However, if there is 
not absolute mobility of the factors of production from country to country, 
the development of industry may contribute to bring incomes in the 
primary producer countries up to the level of industrial countries. In so 
far as this occurs there will be a net profit for the primary producer. 
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Nevertheless, in order that this levelling may take place, it would be 
necessary for other competitor countries in primary production not to 
force competition in their own favour by lowering wages. That is pre-
cisely the great difficulty facing the periphery, as has been indicated else-
where in this chapter. But there is another source of net profit which is 
less problematic, since industry and its allied occupations add a net 
increase to incomes previously earned when employing the surplus popu-
lation formerly gainfully employed in primary production and dislodged 
therefrom by technical progress. This increase will be proportionately 
greater as the productivity of the new industries reaches that of those 
industries in the countries which are more advanced technically and it 
represents a net profit even though productivity be inferior. Consequently, 
owing to the lack of international mobility of the factors of production 
we have to measure economic advantage in development of the periphery, 
by standards different from those possibly suggested by the above theory. 
The third conclusion relates to the way of extending technical progress. 
In the theoretical argument we have been examining, the fact that a group 
of occupations increases productivity presupposes that the resultant lower-
ing of prices will immediately benefit all other activities, creating an 
additional margin of income available to increase demand or savings. 
But in fact, if prices do not fall in the large centres as productivity 
increases and income rises, then greater demand and savings capacity 
will be developed only in the centres. This would mean that the peripheral 
countries have, on the one hand, remained unaffected by such advantages 
while, on the other, they are faced with the problem of assimilating an 
advanced industrial technique which requires extensive development of 
both demand and savings. But this point will be dealt with in another 
chapter. 
To sum up, the discrepancy between the theoretic argument based upon 
absolute mobility of productive factors and the realities of economic 
experience is so significant for the theory of economic development in 
Latin America in particular, and the periphery in general, that we shall 
have to overhaul our theories thoroughly. A revision of this nature, being 
based upon premises closer to reality, will help us to state, on sound 
premises, the essential lines of a policy of economic development. 
10. T H E ECONOMIC CYCLE AND FLUCTUATION OF TERMS OF TRADE 
In reviewing the theory, from the point of view of the development of 
the periphery, the study of the economic cycle must be given special 
consideration. Even though the low mobility of the factors of production 
as technical progress spreads suffices to explain the great differences 
between incomes at the centre and those of the periphery, these differ-
ences are created precisely during the cyclical movement. In other words, 
the cycle has, in fact, been the mode of growth of the capitalist economy. 
These phenomena are of great interest to the Latin-American countries, 
and hence we shall consider some of them in concluding this chapter. 
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It is a well-known fact that, during the cycle, prices move in favour 
of primary products during the upswing but, during the downswing, 
generally tend to fall more than they had previously risen. Thus, as the 
price level falls during each depression more than it had risen during the 
preceding period of prosperity, we find that over a number of cycles, 
there is a continuous tendency for the terms of trade to worsen, as has 
been shown above. 
These periodic falls in the price relations are the result of the way in 
which, in cyclical downswings, the benefits of technical progress are trans-
ferred from entrepreneurs to their social groups. During the upswing, 
despite increased productivity, prices rise and the profits of the entre-
preneurs rise concurrently. If increased productivity brought immediate 
improvements to wages and salaries, these would have to rise more than 
prices. This does not usually occur during the upswing, when prices 
frequently rise more than wages so that the benefits accruing from tech-
nical progress remain in the hands of the entrepreneurs. It is during the 
cyclical downswing that these benefits are transferred to wages, which 
decrease less than prices, thus establishing a more favourable relation for 
wages ; and greater advantage is taken of this as a new phase of prosperity 
absorbs the unemployment which marks the cyclical downswing. 
In other words, during the depression, wages lose only a part of the 
benefits obtained during the period of prosperity and thus can reap the 
benefits of technical progress. Naturally, the whole of the benefits does 
not go into wages. The State has been taking an increasing proportion 
of the benefits derived from technical progress and so has been able to 
widen the scope of its activities. Other social classes also take their share, 
to a greater or lesser extent, and, furthermore, as competition between 
entrepreneurs is limited, these are left with a greater share than they 
would otherwise have had. However, we are not concerned with the 
distribution of benefits in the centres but rather in the sum of the respective 
increments of productivity which remains there, as compared with that 
remaining in the periphery. 
Let us assume that after a period of depression, the net increment to 
income at the centres is equivalent to the increase of production obtained 
by greater productivity. It is evident that if the full benefits remain in the 
centres, the periphery will obtain no share at all. Now let us assume that 
the net increase in income at the centre is greater than the increase of 
production there ; this would mean that the periphery must have transferred 
part of its increased productivity to the centre and even part of the real 
income which it formerly enjoyed. 
The question now arises : What are the forces which allow the industrial 
centres to exert such pressure on the periphery, retaining the profits of 
their own technical progress or even taking possession of part of the benefits 
accruing to the periphery ? 
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To answer this question, let us recall some observations made in a pre-
vious document regarding certain manifestations of cyclical phenomena at 
the centres and in the periphery.2 During the cyclical upswing, demand for 
finished goods in the centres is greater than supply. There exists, therefore, 
an excess demand increasing profits for the entrepreneurs and giving rise 
to other phenomena; these phenomena in which the periphery plays an 
important part, eventually transform this excess into shortage and so lead 
to the cyclical downswing, wherein demand becomes less than the aggregate 
supply price of finished production. As the value of the aggregate supply, 
swollen by the higher profits of earlier stages in the productive process, 
cannot be easily reduced by lowering prices, stocks of finished goods 
temporarily unsaleable at those various stages are accumulated. 
Then a series of reactions follows which tend to lower the aggregate 
supply price until demand once again begins to absorb current production. 
This way of decreasing the aggregate supply price of finished goods is 
of great importance to the periphery. In fact, this price, as mentioned 
before, was augmented at the centres by the addition of profits. However, 
some of these were converted into increases in wages and other forms of 
income. For the sake of brevity, and to avoid entering upon any unnecessary 
complexities, we will refer merely to the increase of wages, this being the 
more significant phenomenon. If the aforesaid decrease in the supply price 
were affected in proportion to increases of profits and wages, which had 
previously raised that price, one would simply return to the point of de-
parture, and both the centres and the periphery would share equally in the 
benefits of technical progress, whatever their amount in either place. 
However, this is not the case, owing to the mechanism of the cyclical 
downswing and the nature of the forces affecting it. The accumulation of 
surplus stocks causes the sellers of finished goods to scale down their demand 
for the goods of their immediate suppliers; these in turn scale down their 
requirements of the goods of their suppliers, and so on to the stage of the 
entrepreneurs of primary production in the periphery. In each of these 
stages, through which the cyclical downswing is transmitted, employment 
and profits decrease. 
It is a recognized fact, however, that at the centres there is great resist-
ance to any lowering of wages, despite unemployment, and in some sectors 
to the reduction of profits. This constitutes an obstacle to the lowering of 
the part of the aggregate supply price accounted for by the centres and 
when it cannot take place to the extent necessary to bring it nearer into 
line with aggregate demand, surplus stocks will continue to accumulate. 
It then follows that the greater the volume of these surplus stocks, the 
greater the need to curtail production and therefore, the demand for primary 
products : and the greater the fall in the price of these primary products. 
In the periphery, lower prices for primary goods naturally mean lower 
profits and adverse pressure on wages in communities in which labour 
2
 "The economic development of Latin America and its principal problems," op. cit. 
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organizations, where they exist, are far less powerful than in the cyclical 
centres. 
The greater part of production costs corresponding to the stages com-
pleted in the industrial centres is made up of the wages paid at those stages. 
Therefore, the fact that wages suffer a relatively small decrease means 
inevitably that it is for the periphery to reduce the aggregate supply price, 
so that the greater the wage increase during the cyclical upswing and the 
more rigid wages become during the downswing, the greater will be the 
pressure exerted by the centres on the periphery, through the reduction of 
their demand for primary goods and the consequent lowering of the price 
of these goods. 
This occurs, other factors which influence the intensity and duration of 
the cyclical downswing remaining equal. For instance, if during the up-
swing, only a relatively small part of the profits has flowed into wages, 
the fact that during the downswing profits may become inelastic would 
have even more serious consequences than the rigidity of wages, since 
the former, during the depression, are the most important source of hoard-
ing, to the detriment of demand. 
Having made this qualification, let us continue the analysis. If, on the 
one hand, at the centres we have this relationship between the net increase 
in wages and their resistance to decline, and, on the other hand, we have 
the intensity of the pressure exerted by the centre on the periphery, it is 
not difficult to understand that if the net increase of wages is greater than 
that of productivity, in accordance with a previous assumption, then pres-
sure on the periphery will be so great that the lowering of prices will take 
from the periphery an ever-increasing share of the benefits of its own tech-
nical progress, or even more, as has been shown above. 
How far does experience show that the periphery can resist this pressure ? 
There have been cases in which large stocks of primary products have 
been accumulated in the periphery in preference to selling at prices con-
sidered too low. But when the periphery resists the constriction of its own 
supply price, the total supply price of finished goods at the centre does 
not fall sufficiently to eliminate the difference between it and demand. 
Hence stocks of finished goods as well as of those being manufactured 
continue to accumulate and there is a steeper decline in the demand for 
primary products. 
Though this explanation is fairly general and each individual case would 
have to be examined separately, the Great Depression of the 1930's showed 
clearly that the pressure on the primary producer countries can be so great 
as to compel them to devalue their currency in order to be able to adapt 
themselves to the fall in prices imposed by the decrease in demand at the 
cyclical centres. In this way, the whole population is affected by the conse-
quences of a readjustment which would otherwise be catastrophic for those 
who derive their income from primary production. 
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It would not be admissible to generalize this inference and argue that 
the chronic tendency towards monetary depreciation, recorded in the 
annals of some of the Latin-American countries, can be attributed to the 
peculiar manner in which this reduction in selling prices occurs during 
the cyclical depressions. But neither would it be reasonable to suggest that 
financial upheaval and the resulting inflation are exclusively to blame for 
that phenomenon, without admitting the influence of the pressure which 
is automatically brought to bear on the periphery during the cyclical 
downswing. The whole problem offers a most interesting field for study. 
It is evident that if there had been notable increases of productivity in 
the periphery, this area would have been better prepared to withstand 
the effects of such pressure by surrendering to the centres the benefits 
recently acquired through increased productivity. But if there were no 
such advantages, the periphery would find itself compelled to surrender 
a part of the benefits acquired in the previous phase of development. This 
is precisely one of the reasons why the world economic crisis affected 
Latin America and other peripheral countries so seriously. Depressions 
prior to the First World War had been shorter and far less intense. One 
must go back to the seventies of the last century to find as long a depres-
sion, though less intense. However, the downswing of the seventies co-
incided with a period during which Latin America was rapidly increasing 
its indirect productivity, by incorporating new areas into international 
productive activity, as we said earlier. There was, therefore, a wider 
margin of benefits derived from technical progress in the periphery to 
be shared with the centres. 
Here we have another case where the course of events subsequent to 
the world economic crisis, when contrasted with those leading up to it, 
offers us a better vantage point from which to analyse the problem of 
economic development in Latin America. Yet this is not the only important 
comparison, as was shown in the preceding chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONTRASTS AND DIFFERENCES IN THE PROCESS OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
1. HIGH DEGREE OF CAPITALIZATION AND LOW LEVEL OF INCOME 
We have defined the economic development of Latin America as a new 
stage in the world-wide extension of the capitalist technique of production. 
To a certain extent, we are now witnessing a process similar to that which 
took place in the nineteenth century, when countries which today are 
great centres began their industrial development. The phenomena are not, 
however, identical, for conditions of the international economy which now 
prevail are, as has already been shown, very different from those which 
obtained then; the later phenomena present unique characteristics which 
had no cause to develop in the earlier centres, at least not in so manifest 
a form. We shall consider this aspect of the problem in the present 
chapter. 
These peculiar characteristics are, in fact, the expression of the con-
trast between the very advanced stage of capitalist development in the 
great centres and the pre- or semi-capitalist state of a considerable part of 
Latin America.1 
Contrasts of this type are due to the long time which has elapsed since the 
Industrial Revolution. They could not have arisen at the beginning of 
the process, since conditions in the countries which followed the example 
of industrialization set by Great Britain were very similar to conditions 
obtaining in the latter country. At that time, capitalist technique was only 
beginning to develop and the British national income had hardly increased. 
Furthermore, all these countries founded their new-born industry on the 
solid historic base of an artisan class. 
Industrial progress since then has been very great and consequently has 
widened the gap between the highly developed centres and the peripheral 
countries, in which modern technique generally has only been introduced 
into export activities. In the more highly developed countries, productive 
technique requires a high capital investment per man employed. However, 
the gradual increase in productivity brought about by this technique 
1
 Of course, many intermediary stages occur in Latin America in the industrial 
sectors which, so far as productivity is concerned, are closer to the great centres than 
to other Latin-American sectors where production is primary and productivity ex-
tremely low. Therefore, in examining the concrete facts we must keep in mind the dif-
ferent stages of evolution in Latin America. 
62 
CONTRASTS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 6 3 
enabled these countries to attain a high level of per capita income, so that 
they could effect the savings required to create the needed capital. On the 
other hand, savings are low in the majority of the Latin-American coun-
tries because of the low income level. When the great modern industrial 
centres were in a position comparable to that of present-day peripheral 
areas, and the per capita income in these centres was relatively low, pro-
ductive technique also required only a relatively small capital investment 
per man. Careful study shows that savings are neither great nor small of 
themselves, but only in relation to the density of capital, determined by 
technical progress. In this sense, savings in Latin America are, on the 
whole, very small in comparison with the requirements of modern tech-
nique. Certainly in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution of the 
great centres, voluntary savings were not very great either, but neither 
did technique at that time require the large capital coefficient per man 
needed nowadays. Technical improvements were only brought into use 
as increases in productivity, income and savings made them economically 
possible and practical. In other words, one must go back several decades, 
if not a whole century, to find per capita incomes equivalent to those gen-
erally obtaining in Latin-American countries nowadays. 
In that period capitalist technique was still in the first stages of its 
development, whereas now it manifests itself in a high degree of capitaliza-
tion, not easily within the reach of the scanty savings that can be put 
aside out of the low incomes prevalent in Latin America. It follows, there-
fore, that the later modern technique is introduced into a peripheral 
country, the sharper will be the contrast between its low total income and 
the large amount of capital necessary to increase this income rapidly; so 
that, had similar contrasts appeared in the development of the great 
centres, they would have been less sharp than those observed now.2 
Consequently, countries which have recently begun their industrial 
development have, on the one hand, the advantage of finding a degree of 
technique in the great centres which required time and sacrifice to ac-
quire ; but on the other hand, they encounter all the disadvantages inherent 
in lagging behind in the course of evolution. 
2 . LOW INCOMES AND INSUFFICIENT DEMAND 
Another important consequence of the disparity between the degree 
of growth of income and that of productive technique is the low level of 
demand which generally characterizes the greater part of the Latin-
American populations, despite their numerical size. Not only does lack of 
capital or of skill in managing it stand in the way of the adoption of ad-
vanced methods of technique but, in addition, low demand makes it 
2
 Situations similar in this and other respects may have occurred in the economic 
history of Japan ; it would be very interesting to compare them with conditions in 
Latin America. 
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impossible to reap the benefits of mass production. Industrial develop-
ment in the great centres cannot have been hindered by limitations of 
this kind. There, the originally low income coincided with production on 
a correspondingly small scale. This scale grew in time, as greater pro-
ductivity raised incomes and, with them, demand, which in turn absorbed 
the larger, better and more varied production. 
The situation is very different in the countries which are now adopting 
modern industrial technique. Here demand is low because productivity is 
low ; this is so because weak demand in its turn impedes, along with other 
factors, the utilization of more advanced technique. 
Nevertheless, in large industrial countries, such as the United States 
for instance, there are regions which began to industrialize at a com-
paratively late stage in their development. One may ask if they, too, 
faced the problem of low demand, as does the Latin-American periphery. 
The answer is not without interest since it shows us another of the 
consequences of the distribution of the benefits of technical progress. 
It is a known fact that the great mobility of labour in the United States 
tends to make all income rise as productivity increases, so that income 
rises not only in those occupations where technical progress is greatest, 
but also in those where it is low or non-existent. The increase of income 
is, therefore, a general phenomenon which occurs in all sectors of the 
country, as envisaged by the classical theorists. When productivity is 
increased in the industrial areas, for instance, the resultant increase of 
income is extended to others and, therefore, the capacity to increase de-
mand develops not only in those areas but spreads throughout the whole 
country and the whole economy. The same may be said of the capacity 
to save, and as both these capacities are essential elements of industrial 
development, it is not surprising that industry has not remained within 
the limits of its original areas but rather has gradually extended in differ-
ent directions. If the original areas had been able to retain all the benefits 
of technical progress, there would have arisen a growing disparity between 
the income and consuming and saving capacity of those areas and the 
corresponding factors of the periphery; and the latter would probably 
have been faced with problems similar to those arising today in the inter-
national periphery. 
3. TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
It is also a well-known fact that one of the greatest spurs to technical 
progress in agriculture and other forms of primary production in the 
United States has been the increase in wages deriving from constantly 
increasing industrial productivity. The development of manufacturing and 
other similar activities, as has been said before, absorbed a growing portion 
of the increasing population, compelling primary production constantly to 
improve its technical methods. Thus technical progress in agriculture was 
to a great extent the consequence of industrial development. Agriculture 
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in Latin America also requires considerable technical progress if it is to 
raise the standard of living of the masses. But if this meant that industry 
was going to suffer, we would be faced with another phenomenon which 
did not occur in the development of the great industrial centres. There, 
industry furnished the stimulus for technical progress in agriculture, as 
has just been indicated, whereas in Latin America progress would spring 
from agriculture itself. It is not difficult to foresee the consequences of 
this in the hypothesis under consideration if the unemployed workers 
from the land are not absorbed by industry and other occupations, as they 
are in the centres. The unemployment caused by technical progress would 
prevent the raising of wages, and might even lower them, and the 
benefits of such progress would be lost in a fall in agriculture relatively 
to other prices, for reasons which we need not repeat in view of the 
explanations contained in chapter III. 
These unfavourable influences on employment and wages have often 
led to reactions adverse to technical progress in the development of 
the great industrial Powers. Nevertheless, this same technical progress, 
by requiring increasing capital investments, develops in these countries 
a powerful factor of absorption of unemployed workers through develop-
ment of capital goods industries. Thus we see that technical progress 
creates unemployment but at the same time tends to reabsorb the dis-
placed workers by means of increased investments. Such was the function 
spontaneously discharged by investments in the development of the in-
dustrial centres, at least until the world crisis. 
The element of expansion, the effects of which are felt in all sectors 
of the economic activity of the great centres, is lacking in the peripheral 
countries; consequently their exports are not sufficiently great to offer 
gainful employment to those unemployed as a result of technical improve-
ments. It is not surprising, therefore, that the fear of unemployment is 
ever present,and that it sometimes takes the form of stubborn hostility to 
the use of more advanced capital equipment, the immediate consequence 
of which is to reduce the labour requirements of primary and industrial 
production. The absence of this spontaneous element of development 
does, in fact, lead to extraordinary conditions. In the periphery, technical 
progress is accompanied by unemployment as in the great centres, but 
the demand for capital goods inherent in such progress does not operate, 
in the former as in the latter countries, since there are no capital in-
dustries. Consequently, this demand, instead of being reflected in the 
economy of the developing country, transfers its effects to the industrial 
centres where such goods are produced. If these centres do not compensate 
for this demand for their products by means of a corresponding increase 
of their imports from the Latin-American countries, the unemployment 
caused by technical progress will persist unless it can be countered by 
a policy of economic development. This is another of the fundamental 
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differences in the various ways in which economic development affects 
the centres and the periphery. 
4. AVAILABLE CAPITAL AND THE EXTENT OF ITS UTILIZATION 
The problem is more involved than would at first appear and certainly 
deserves more careful study. In nearly all the Latin-American countries 
there are frequent examples of production employing antiquated machinery, 
already obsolete in other countries where it has been replaced by other 
and more productive machinery. If this modern machinery could be in-
troduced into important sections of primary and industrial production 
and transport in Latin America, increased productivity would cause the 
formation of an additional surplus of labour. The employment of this 
surplus would require a capital investment per man equal to that ob-
taining in the modernized sections, making allowances of course, for the 
difference in the nature of the occupation. The same requirements would 
prevail if technical progress were similarly to be extended to all the 
economic sectors. At this point a very serious problem arises. Would there 
be sufficient capital for the thorough equipment of all the sectors? If 
there were not, and the capital available were only sufficient to allow 
of an investment per man much smaller than the desired figure, how 
could the existing capital best be applied in order to obtain the greatest 
net increase of production, that is to say, of the real total income? 
A problem of this nature could not have arisen in identical terms in 
the great industrial countries by reason of the continuity of their de-
velopment, as we shall now try to show. It is recognized that modern 
equipment which requires a greater capital outlay per man is only 
economical when the total amount paid in interest and amortization is less 
than the amount whereby the new equipment reduces other costs. For 
brevity's sake, let us say the amount whereby it reduces labour costs. 
The progressive rise in wages was perhaps the most important factor in 
establishing the economic advantage of increasing the capital investment 
per man by successive technical improvements. Once the new capital outlay 
had been absorbed, and because of the new level of wages, it would not 
have been economic for a new undertaking to make lower capital outlays 
since these would have resulted in a lower wage level. 
On the other hand, as the mobility of the factors of production extends 
wage increases to other occupations, it seems inconceivable that, in the 
long run, certain industries should raise the capital investment per man 
considerably by making use of increasingly modernized equipment whilst 
others continue to operate with a relatively lower capital outlay. The 
greater the mobility of the factors of production, the more closely will the 
development of the different types of economic activity be correlated with 
capital outlay per man employed. 
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5. OPTIMUM USE OF CAPITAL IN THE PERIPHERY 
When we look at the relative development of an industrial centre and 
of a peripheral country we find that the same does not hold true. The 
fact that, at the centre, new capital outlay is more economical because 
the additional saving in labour more than compensates for the correspond-
ing cost of amortization and interest does not mean that the same would 
occur in a peripheral country where wages are lower and where equip-
ment must be imported from the centre. In the centre, the cost of the 
machinery is determined by wage levels similar to those of the labour saved, 
while in a country where wages are lower than those at the centre, the 
total saving will be proportionately less. In other words, the peripheral 
country imports capital equipment manufactured at high wage rates in 
order to obtain a lowering of costs computed in low wage rates. 
Furthermore, the relative abundance of savings at the centres enables 
them to obtain the amounts necessary to achieve a high density of capital 
per man without putting too great a strain on the interest rate. In coun-
tries where savings are scarce, an increase in the density of capital would 
cause a considerable rise in the interest rates. Thus in the peripheral 
countries, the cost of capital rises more than at the centres, as the density 
of capital per man increases, while at the same time the reduction in 
the cost of labour is less, on account of the lower wage level.3 Therefore 
it appears that the optimum combination of labour and capital equipment 
in the less developed countries requires a lower density of capital per 
man than in the highly developed industrial countries; the greater the 
differences between the respective wage and interest levels, the lower 
should be the degree of capital density, other factors remaining equal. 
We will not consider these here in order not to complicate the problem 
further. 
The foregoing analysis enables us to answer our earlier queries. Let 
us take a country where the average optimum density of capital is half 
that of a developed industrial centre; this average is obtained by the 
combination of the optimum densities in the various industries and 
occupations, densities which differ more or less from their counterparts 
in the centre according to their individual characteristics. According to 
common theoretical beliefs, in each of the optimum densities the last 
increase of capital in any investment should lead to a marginal increase 
of production equivalent to that of outlays in other economic sectors and 
also equal to the cost of the amortization and interest corresponding to 
the capital increase. If the density of capital is increased further and 
goes beyond the optimum, its cost will be higher than the new increases 
of production and hence would not be economical. Thus, to go beyond 
the optimum degree in a given industry, in order to reach the optimum 
3
 When inflation occurs, the collective cost to the people rises in proportion to the 
amount of forced savings imposed upon the population. 
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level obtaining in the centres, would not be to the good of the general 
economy, since there would be an excess of capital in industry and a 
shortage of it in other occupations; consequently, the total production 
would be lower than could be obtained by means of an optimum distri-
bution of capital. These then, are more of the characteristic differences 
between economic development in the periphery and at the centres which, 
though of considerable influence, have not yet been studied with the 
attention they deserve. 
(, 6. DISTORTION IN THE OPTIMUM COMBINATIONS 
This simple theoretical presentation does not by itself throw enough 
light on the realities of the Latin-American problem. The factors affecting 
the optimum arrangement are hidden or distorted by others, among which 
inflation is perhaps the most important. 
In order to understand this aspect of the situation, let us analyse a 
very simple example. Let us assume the case of an industry in which new 
capital investments are required in order to meet growing demand. Our 
entrepreneur is faced with two alternatives, both of which would enable 
him to obtain the same additional increment of production. One solution 
requires him to employ 3,000 labourers and invest a capital of 6 million 
units. The other means employing only 2,400 labourers but requires the 
investment of 18 million units. In either case he must have recourse to 
the market to obtain his capital. The annual wage per labourer amounts 
to 2,000 units and amortization and interest amount to 10 per cent. The 
second solution means the utilization of an extra 12 million units of capital, 
which exactly equals the saving on labour. Therefore, both alternatives 
represent equal production costs and, consequently, equal profits. How-
ever, since the entrepreneur must obtain his capital from the market, in 
the favourable event that he can obtain the larger amount required at 
the same rate of interest, he will nevertheless prefer the first alternative, 
since with a debt which is only one-third of the other he can obtain the 
same production and identical profits. 
The situation would be very different if the same entrepreneur had 
previously obtained high profits through inflation or if imports of the 
goods he tnanufactured had been restricted either on account of currency 
shortages or for some other reason. If the profits accruing to the entre-
preneur were sufficient to cover the amount required by the second solu-
tion, he might well adopt it, since besides obtaining profits equivalent 
to those deriving from the first alternative, it would represent a profitable 
investment for his surplus capital and he could retain for himself the 
interest and amortization which otherwise he would have to pay to a 
third party. 
It is true that in this case the entrepreneur could combine it with the 
first alternative, using the surplus profits in making interest-bearing 
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loans, but he would hardly wish to be a creditor at the height of an 
inflation and would therefore probably adopt the second alternative. 
If there are other industries equally accessible and yielding greater 
profits, it is obvious that the entrepreneur will prefer to invest his capital 
in them. However, he will probably be faced with situations similar to 
the one described above ; and in this eventuality he would probably again 
be inclined to an over-investment of capital. 
Could there, however, be over-investment of capital if this phenomenon 
occurred, not just in certain industries, but generally in the whole range 
of economic activity? Could not a general increase of productivity be 
obtained in this way, approaching that of the great industrial countries, 
which would make it possible to raise the wage level and so justify a 
greater density of capital investment per man? It is precisely this which 
it is difficult to foresee in Latin America for the following reasons. 
In the first place, inflation and import restrictions do not affect all 
occupations equally. Profits are therefore not strictly proportionate to the 
real increase of productivity obtained by the latest capital investments, but 
to the extent to which this and other factors affect each occupation, so that 
investments do not correspond to a rigid concept of productivity essential 
to the optimum distribution of available capital. Thus investments are 
made which yield greater profits and for which ipso facto greater amounts 
of capital become available. This undoubtedly creates a propitious field 
for over-investment, with an artificially high density of capital. On the 
other hand, there are occupations which, because they were not protected 
by restrictions on imports or inflationary deviations of demand, yield 
much lower profits and, though a larger investment in these might lead 
to greater productivity, the incentive and the resources available are, 
in this case, much smaller than in the preceding example. In the same 
way, there are very important activities, such as transport, for instance, 
which because they do not share in the high profits accruing from in-
flation, so far from attracting new capital, actually lost capital. 
Hence the increase in the density of capital in certain occupations does 
not necessarily mean a general increase in all of them approaching the 
optimum density of capital of the larger countries. It signifies rather a 
definite distortion in the series of optimum combinations suitable for 
a developing country. 
7. OVER-CAPITALIZATION AND THE TERMS OF TRADE 
On the other hand, most of the Latin-American countries, as mentioned 
before, are contending with the serious problem of supplying an adequate 
density of capital to the mass of the population which is still in a pre- or 
semi-capitalistic state. This is an essential factor and hence we are in-
clined to ask if productivity would not be stepped up more by a national 
distribution of capital among the sectors where productivity could be 
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considerably increased, rather than by concentrating the density of capital 
in certain activities which are over-stimulated by inflation and restrictions. 
Again, in the extreme supposition that it were socially possible and 
advisable to create the necessary savings by means of inflation, the 
enormous amount of capital needed in these countries to increase its 
density rapidly would create insoluble problems of foreign transfer. 
Most of the capital goods must be imported, and no matter how much 
domestic consumption is restricted and the population compelled to save, 
the foreign exchange deriving from exports would soon be insufficient 
to cover the demand for capital goods, as well as other essential imports. 
The monetary aspect of the problem of expansion and capitalization need 
not concern us here. It will suffice to note other characteristics which 
occur in the development of the Latin-American countries. This should 
serve as another reminder not to examine these problems as if they were 
similar to those which occur in different types of development. 
There are two obstacles in the way of the formation of capital, which 
have just been indicated: the domestic accumulation of sufficient savings, 
and the limited capacity of exports to pay, to the necessary extent, for 
imports of capital goods. If this limitation were to be abolished and ex-
ports forced by monetary devaluation or other means, in order to import 
more capital goods, the terms of trade would inevitably deteriorate because 
of the factors analysed in chapter III. 
Capital formation in the countries which are now great industrial 
centres does not seem to have encountered obstacles of this nature'/ On 
the one hand, a considerable part of their capital goods are manufactured 
in their own economy, so that even forcing the process by means of in-
flation did not imply the same external consequences as in the Latin-
American countries. On the other hand, when the centres were compelled 
to expand their exports in order to cover shortage in the domestic pro-
duction of capital goods, they exported manufactured goods under far 
more advantageous conditions than those obtaining in countries of primary 
production, since by exporting manufactured goods they were able to 
retain the benefits of technical progress more easily in the form of higher 
income. The goods manufactured as a result of the investment of this 
high income were exchanged for capital goods, also deriving from the 
investment of equally high incomes. This is the opposite of what occurs 
in the periphery. Furthermore, in exporting these goods the countries of 
the centre generally met with a very elastic demand, since the increase 
of real income in the various industrial countries was accompanied by a 
corresponding increase in reciprocal demand for these goods, as can be 
seen from the statistics showing the growing industrial trade of these 
countries before the First World War. Consequently when one of the 
countries of the centre exported in order to be able to import capital 
goods, there was no adverse effect on its terms of trade. 
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The position of the Latin-American countries as exporters of primary 
products, raises the problem of partial over-capitalization, or of the rapid 
increase in the density of capita], which will repay careful study as re-
gards both fact and theory. The forcing of exports in order to capitalize 
to an extraordinary degree, in the absence of foreign investment, might 
lead a country to sacrifice its real income unnecessarily precisely when 
it had intended to increase it. In fact, if the process is carried to excess, 
the additional labour employed in order to increase exports at lower prices 
might be less productive than if it had been employed in producing for 
domestic consumption, with a lower density of capital than that proposed 
to be attained by force. In other words, an uneconomic increase of density 
of capital might result owing to the deterioration in the terms of trade 
caused by the additional exports. 
All these differentiations which mark Latin-American development are, 
in the final analysis, the result of the distribution of the benefits of technical 
progress and of the differences between the degree of evolution of these 
countries and that of the great industrial centres. 
8. OTHER ASPECTS OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND PRODUCTIVITY 
So far, we have limited ourselves to the study of these characteristic 
differences in relation to capitalization. To increase the capital per man 
is an essential but not the only condition for increasing productivity. The 
ability to organize, manage and administer on the one hand, and the 
tehnical skill of labour on the other, are also of great importance. One 
of the most significant conclusions drawn from a study of Latin America's 
textile industry being carried out by the Commission's experts, relates 
to this question. In important countries where industry generally is using 
antiquated equipment, productivity could be considerably increased even 
with the same equipment but with better organization and administration 
and a more rational utilization of their manpower. In the majority of 
the cases examined, the higher productivity attainable in this way would 
exceed that obtainable by a modernization of machinery and plant. 
It is, of course, very important to have adequate equipment but knowing 
how to make the best use of it is equally important. For example, cases 
have occurred in which the equipment used was comparable to that in 
use in countries with very advanced textile industries ; yet even with this 
equipment productivity was extremely low precisely on account of defective 
organization and administration. 
An inflation may suddenly produce the necessary resources for the 
purchase of modern equipment, but it could hardly offer as swiftly the 
required skilled labour, which naturally takes time to develop. 
Here we find another of the contrasts which are the consequence of a 
very uneven degree of development. In the large industrial countries, 
this skill, as well as the efficiency of labour, developed progressively, at 
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the same rate as productive technique. Skill, efficiency and technique were, 
in fact, forms of the same general phenomenon which, though it emerged 
with the industrial revolution, had been evolving throughout centuries 
of artisan work and the growth of trade experience. 
On the other hand, in the peripheral countries, where the technique 
and the organization of the great centres usually only penetrated super-
ficially and where the population was in a pre-capitalist phase or merely 
in a rudimentary state of capitalism, the sudden awakening to the com-
plex processes involved by such technique and organization was bound 
to cause reaction and consequences which had not marked the industrial 
development of the great countries. 
Accordingly, productivity involves two closely connected factors: first, 
the investment of savings in capital goods, and second, the investment of 
savings in the training of men who can make the best use of these goods 
at the various stages of production. One of the points requiring most 
attention in the development of the Latin-American countries is the 
judicious apportionment between the two forms of investment of the 
scanty increase in savings in order to obtain the maximum increase in 
productivity. 
9. DIFFERENCES IN THE CAPACITY TO CONSUME 
Differences of the nature described occur not only in production but also 
in the capacity to consume ; and this in turn affects production. Technical 
progress has enabled the population of the great industrial centres to 
diversify their consumption remarkably, constantly offering these com-
munities new articles or improving existing ones, making daily life easier, 
or creating new tastes to replace those already satisfied by means of the 
constant increase in income. These are types of consumption corresponding 
to the more advanced stages of economic development, but which in 
themselves develop an extraordinary power of diffusion and tend to 
spread to the populations of countries which, being less advanced, have 
a lower level of productivity and therefore smaller incomes with which 
to acquire these goods. 
In other words, countries where per capita income is comparable to 
that long before enjoyed by the great industrial centres tend to imitate 
types of consumption prevailing at the centres today. At the same time 
they are trying to assimilate the productive technique of the industrial 
centres, which requires considerable per capita savings. As income is 
relatively low in the peripheral countries, it is not surprising to find 
them torn between the greater propensity to consume and the imperative 
necessity to capitalize. The result frequently is inflation, which is further 
aggravated if these advanced forms of direct consumption coincide with 
the increase of services of the State, for the State is equally susceptible 
by force of circumstances to the example of new forms of expenditure in 
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the high-income countries, though not so ready to adopt modern defence 
measures. The latter makes it even more necessary to increase the general 
productivity of these countries which are thus striving to assume central 
types of consumption. 
10. CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES AND COMMON ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM 
OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
We have tried in this chapter to explain briefly the causes of some of 
the characteristic features of the expansion of technical progress to Latin 
America. Ultimately, though the primary design of raising productivity 
has the great advantage of being able to make use of the experience of 
the great industrial nations, avoiding their trials and errors, it also meets 
with difficulties arising from the fact that those countries which developed 
first are more advanced as regards income, productivity and capitaliza-
tion. Thus, though it seems paradoxical, it may be said that the high 
productivity of the great industrial countries is one of the greatest ob-
stacles which the peripheral countries must overcome in order to attain a 
similar degree of productivity. 
When other countries followed the example of Great Britain's indus-
trial development, they met similar obstacles, but much less serious than 
those nowadays encountered by newly developing countries. Despite these 
obstacles, the United Kingdom, in being first to possess modern tech-
nique, had obvious advantages over those countries which strove to attain 
it later, so much so that, without any exception, all the countries that 
developed subsequently to the United Kingdom were compelled to adopt 
measures to stimulate and protect the industries they wished to establish. 
Despite the above comparisons and contrasts, this last factor provides 
an element common to the problem of the economic development of Latin 
America and the initial and successive stages of that same development in 
those countries which are now great centres, with the exception that the 
differences of productivity between the most and the least advanced 
of these countries were in earlier times less than those existing today 
between the centre and the periphery. 
There is a further common element. The assimilation of modern pro-
ductive technique with its increasing complexity was not spontaneous 
but deliberate, and required considerable effort and persistence. This 
is all of great importance to the development of Latin America, since 
the differences in the standard of living between the developed and the 
developing countries does not only depend on the differences between 
their respective natural resources but to a great extent on the effective 
capacity to assimilate technique, build up the necessary savings and 
make the best use of both. The development of this capacity will therefore 
be a predominating factor in the economic evolution of the countries which 
are now in the growing stage. 
CHAPTER V 
CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN 
INCOME AND PRODUCTIVITY 
1. REACTIONS CAUSED BY DIFFERENCES OF INCOME 
The relatively slow rate at which modern technique has spread through-
out the world and the way its benefits are distributed, have led to con-
siderable differences in the per capita income and productivity of the 
various economic regions of the world. 
There are, of course, natural forces at work which tend gradually to 
level these differences, though regarded from a historical point of view 
they are perhaps still too slow. On the other hand, there is a school of 
thought which believes in the free play of these forces, and builds an 
abstract world wherein the mobility of the factors of production and their 
free and easy displacement play a decisive role. The premise of these 
abstract views does not coincide with realities obtaining in the economic 
world, as they in fact appear to us. This tendency toward the relative 
levelling of incomes, which would offer similar opportunities for increasing 
productivity in the different international sectors is, in fact, a fallacy; 
there is not even an approach to any levelling such as is propounded by 
these theorists. But this does not mean that they do not assist us in ob-
taining a better understanding of the facts, for they do, in fact, emphasize 
the difference existing between the propositions put forward by their 
theory and the reality of the situation. 
In any case, these differences between the levels of per capita income 
and productivity have, in different countries, led to certain measures 
which, despite their diversity, aim either deliberately or otherwise at one 
of the following objectives according to each case: countries with a rela-
tively high income quite understandably try to avoid the pressure of low 
income in other countries which would be detrimental to them; whereas 
the low-income countries attempt to raise their income by overcoming 
certain adverse reactions deriving from the measures taken by the high-
income countries, or deriving from the actual operation of the economic 
system in the high-income countries. 
2. DEFENCE OF THE HIGH INCOME LEVEL 
The way in which the United States attempts to protect its high-income 
level, obtained by an intensive and systematic effort to increase pro-
ductivity by means of technical progress, is very illuminating and allows 
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us to draw conclusions which are well in keeping with the object of the 
present study. 
The process has already been explained elsewhere. We need only recall 
that in the United States technical progress does not occur to the same 
extent in all the branches of productive activity. The tendency towards 
higher income, however, is general. If wages rise in one important in-
dustry owing to a marked increase in productivity, the rise tends to 
spread through all other activities, even if the increase in productivity in 
these latter has been relatively lower or even non-existent. Then, though 
in the first sector costs do not rise and prices may even fall, in the other 
activities the rise in wages, which is greater than the increase of pro-
ductivity, will increase costs and hence the cost and price of the goods 
or services. 
Accordingly, industries which could previously compete favourably with 
foreign imports, either because of greater efficiency or because of pro-
tective tariffs, require protective customs duties or higher duties to defend 
themselves against this competition. It is possible that the productivity 
of foreign industry may be lower than that of the United States, but 
lower wages can offset this difference and allow the foreign industry to 
place its production in the United States at a lower price than the 
domestic industry. 
The foundation of the argument for tariff protection in this case is 
well-known : but for these tariffs, foreign competition would destroy 
activities of which the monetary cost was higher, despite their greater 
productivity ; this would lead to unemployment, which in turn would react 
adversely on the high wage level of other industries. 
3. MEASURES TO CORRECT DIFFERENCES IN THE LEVEL OF CERTAIN INCOMES 
Protective tariffs are raised so that foreign competition shall not im-
pair the high wage level obtained by technical progress. Let us now 
consider another case, in which measures are adopted not in order to 
defend the high wage level, but to raise it in some occupations in which 
it has lagged behind because the spontaneous economic forces were not 
sufficient to raise the level to that of other activities. A typical example 
can be found in agriculture in the United States during the 1930's. As 
elsewhere, cyclical pressure during the world crisis adversely affected 
agriculture in the peripheral areas of the United States, farm earnings 
falling more steeply than industrial earnings. Later, when conditions im-
proved, agricultural income lagged behind, since income in industry and 
other activities did not increase sufficiently to absorb the surplus man-
power which technical progress and the increase of population had re-
leased from agriculture. Thus, for the first time, there was a halt in the 
downward trend of employment in agriculture, in relation to the total 
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of the gainfully employed population during the 1930's. This failure of 
industry to absorb the surplus agricultural manpower was one of the 
factors which prevented agricultural income from rising in proportion to 
that of industry.1 If industry and other activities had been able to absorb 
this surplus, agriculture would have enjoyed higher incomes and more 
favourable terms of trade. Since this did not occur, the terms of trade 
deteriorated greatly for the farmer ; the system of subsidies was intro-
duced to compensate for the low prices of agricultural produce and to 
restore between them and industrial prices a relationship similar to that 
which had existed previously. This system, which accordingly was called 
the system of "parity prices", consisted in deliberately making available 
to agriculture an income similar to that which it would have received had 
the benefits of technical progress been evenly distributed between agri-
culture and industry. 
Clearly, the fact that income in agriculture had not risen as much as 
income in industry led to the use of artificial means to accomplish what 
the normal operation of the economic system could not accomplish unaided. 
Yet, if agricultural income had risen as much as industrial income, 
agricultural prices would also have been higher than they were, and 
many items would no doubt have been unable to compete on the inter-
national market. The parity price system made this competition possible, 
for although the farmer received the international price for certain products, 
he also received a subsidy from the State. The subsidy thus raises agri-
cultural income and at the same time enables certain products to compete 
favourably on foreign markets, without detriment to that income. 
This, then, is another instance of the use of deliberate action to protect 
a high level of income against the effects of foreign competition. In the 
first of the examples cited, foreign competition of low-income countries 
is reflected in domestic consumption, whereas in the second case exports 
are affected. The similarity between the two lies in the fact that in either 
case subsidies are resorted to in order to maintain in the respective ac-
tivities incomes higher than those in the competing countries. In the 
one case, the subsidy takes the form of customs duties, while in the other, 
the method adopted is that of compensatory payments in order to bring 
prices to the same level. 
There are other less important but equally significant examples in 
which the same results are obtained without State assistance. For instance, 
there is the example of North-American steel which before the Second 
World War competed in the foreign markets with "European export 
prices, irrespective of the prices obtaining in the American domestic 
1
 This phenomenon is of great interest to the Latin-American countries since it 
confirms what has been said elsewhere with regard to the possible adverse consequences 
of technical progress in primary production, should employment in industry and its 
related activities not develop at the rate required to absorb the excess of gainfully 
employed population. 
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market. In the home market, where the overwhelming proportion of the 
American production was generally sold, prices did not fall to the very 
low level reached in the export markets".2 
These facts have been mentioned with strict objectivity. It is not a 
question of judging the policy on which these measures are based, but 
of interpreting their economic significance, since this may enable us to 
understand more clearly certain aspects of the problem of the economic 
development of Latin America. 
4. COMPETITION OF LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES 
The classical theory, however, envisaged a different solution to these 
problems. The consequences of the mobility of the factors of production 
and the free distribution of products would have been very different, 
for they would have tended to level down incomes instead of levelling them 
up, which is what in fact slowly occurs as technical progress and in-
dustrialization are extended. At this point let us consider the case of 
Japanese competition to learn what lesson it can teach us for the economic 
development of the periphery. Japan was able to assimilate modern tech-
nique rapidly but did not raise wages to the levels of the great industrial 
countries. Perhaps the pressure of the vast numbers employed in primary 
production with a low level of productivity, together with the considerable 
increase of population, counteracted the tendency towards rising wages. 
Be that as it may, one of the reasons for Japan's strong competitive posi-
tion in world markets, principally in the British market, lies in the fact that 
the benefits of technical progress tended in this case to be transferred 
to the rest of the world to a greater extent than occurred in the case 
of other industrial countries. Japan's incomes thus remained lower than 
those of other industrial countries ; nevertheless, through industrialization 
Japan was able to increase considerably per capita productivity with an 
evident net increase in income, which would probably not have been possible 
without the expansion of exports. 
To be able to compete favourably with Japan in certain branches of 
activity, other industrial countries would have had to lower their wage 
levels, which would have led to serious economic and social disturbances. 
In order to avoid these consequences, they were compelled to defend their 
income level by tariff barriers protecting the industries affected when this 
competition entered their domestic market, though on the international 
market they were unable to carry the defence further than certain bilateral 
compensation agreements concluded between the two world wars. 
2
 European steel trends in the setting of the world market, Economic Commission for 
Europe, United Nations, Geneva 1949, pages 44 and 45. 
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5. MEASURES TO AVOID THE DROP IN INCOME AND TO STIMULATE ITS 
INCREASE 
This is not the only interesting aspect of the problems presented by 
the differences in income and productivity. The experience of Great 
Britain between the two wars includes much that is of interest concerning 
peripheral economic development. It is well-known that chronic unem-
ployment in Britain occurred principally in those branches of the export 
industry which could not continue to compete with other countries, either 
because of the latter's greater technical progress or because of their 
lower income. Furthermore, the United Kingdom's export industries 
were hampered by the growing obstacles placed in their way by industrial 
development in the periphery. This unemployment, which was aggravated 
by the world crisis, represented an enormous loss of income. Great Britain 
was thus compelled to resort to protective tariffs and other restrictive 
measures, in order to stimulate primary and industrial activity, the 
subsequent development of which enabled it to make up the loss of in-
come in a relatively short time. So, even though productivity in the new 
industries or in agriculture was less in that country than in either the 
United States or in Argentina, for instance, there was nevertheless a 
considerable increase in real income. Needless to say, this increase would 
have been still greater had productivity also increased. But that is another 
point, though likewise of considerable importance. 
It might be feasible to enter into a lengthy theoretical analysis which 
would show that, if British wages had declined as a result of unemploy-
ment, the resultant lowering in the cost of production would have per-
mitted the establishment of new industries and guaranteed those already in 
existence, without any need for the deliberate reduction of the import 
coefficient referred to earlier. But even had the reduction of wages increased 
employment—which is very doubtful—it would also have meant a cor-
responding reduction in the price of all British exports for the sake of 
stimulating some of them, a measure implying considerable loss to the 
country's real income. 
We would not enter into discussions of this kind if they did not throw 
some light on the problem of the economic development of Latin America. 
The Latin-American countries have also found it necessary to stimulate 
their industry in order to absorb both the increment of gainfully em-
ployed population, and the surplus which technical progress gradually 
displaces from primary production and other activities. The differences 
in productivity in the periphery and at the centre are such that though 
Latin-American incomes are low in relation to the United States and 
Western Europe, the cost of production does not usually permit Latin-
American countries to meet foreign competition. It is evident that in 
this case, as in the case of Great Britain, the industries developed are 
economical in so far as they represent a net addition to real income which 
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could be much greater if productive technique, including the organization 
and administration of enterprises, were improved. 
It might also be argued in the present case that the free play of 
economic forces would be sufficient to solve the problem of unemploy-
ment or that of employment at low productivity. By this we mean, of 
course, free play in the domestic economy since there is no thought of a 
large-scale shift of population from the periphery to the centres in quest 
of industrial employment. Abstract argument could show that the lowering 
of wages, brought about by the increase and surplus of population re-
ferred to above, would permit costs to decrease to a point where it would 
be possible to compete with foreign imports. The import coefficient would 
thus be lowered automatically and not deliberately as occurs when re-
strictive measures are adopted. 
However, the consquences would be most unfavourable to the periphery. 
In fact, its income, already very low in comparison with that of the in-
dustrial countries, would fall even lower and hence not only the monetary 
cost of domestic production but also that of exports would decline, to the 
obvious detriment of the terms of trade. Moreover, the widening gap 
between the income of the periphery and that of the industrial centres 
would not only augment the relative cost of consumer goods but also the 
amounts necessary for the importation of capital goods. The obstacles 
to industrialization would thus be strengthened and the ratio between 
fixed capital and wages would tend to depart even further from the optimum 
attained at the centre. 
In short, besides involving considerable complications, this type of 
natural adjustment would appreciably reduce the larger net income de-
rived from industrialization. It might even cause a real loss in total income 
if the net income produced by the surplus population added to industrial 
activity were not sufficient to compensate for the loss caused by deteriora-
tion of the terms of trade. 
Consequently, import restrictions deliberately intended to lower the 
import coefficient are, in fact, equivalent to the granting of an internal 
subsidy to the industries which it is intended to stimulate or create in 
order to enable them to yield an,income at least equal to those generally 
prevailing in the country while at the same time increasing the total 
volume of income. Thus we come to the second category of measures men-
tioned at the beginning of this chapter. Countries enjoying a high income 
level take steps to prevent harmful competition from countries with lower 
incomes in cases where these lower incomes or greater productivity or 
a favourable combination of both gives the latter countries an advantage in 
certain branches of production. Meanwhile, the countries with lower 
incomes also take measures in other branches of production to prevent 
the great industrial countries, with their greater productivity and despite 
their high incomes, from hindering the development of their industries 
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and thus lowering their incomes, and widening as a consequence the dif-
ference between their income and that at the centre. 
Another form of competition is that exercised by countries which, by 
effectively assimilating the productive technique of the centres and by 
maintaining a lower income than that of other countries are able to cause 
unemployment in the centres as well as in the developing countries and 
so cause unfavourable reactions on the income levels of both. 
6. T H E DIFFERENCE IN INCOMES AND PLAY OF ECONOMIC FORCES 
The conclusion would seem evident. The disparities or differences in 
income and productivity caused by the uneven development of productive 
technique and the unequal distribution of its benefits present problems 
which, since they cannot be solved automatically and satisfactorily by the 
free play of economic forces within each country, have necessitated the use 
of measures which, though diverse, all tend to protect and to increase 
the level of income attained in the country. If the free play of economic 
forces is not limited to the sphere of national economies but is extended to 
the international, it is conceivable, in the abstract, that a state of affairs 
may emerge in which the absolute mobility of the factors of production 
and the free distribution of products would in time tend to bring about 
a relative levelling of income. However, the economic world of today 
is very different from that abstract creation, and in reality the premise 
of the mobility of the factors of production is not purely economic but 
involves values of another kind which are generally considered more im-
portant than the strictly economic. 
Still, the time spent in considering the consequences of this abstract 
reasoning is not wasted, for in speaking of the free play of economic 
forces one does not always remember that the theory drawn from such 
reasoning has a universal sense. Therefore, when specific cases are con-
sidered, the theory can hardly be divided arbitrarily and applied merely 
to a particular country with the exclusion of all thought of the great in-
ternational consequences. 
Herein lies the justification of the effort made in these pages to throw 
light on the peculiar complexities of economic development and its dis-
parities and.discrepancies. These considerations, which are too sketchy and 
general, are naturally not adequate. Both a more thorough theoretical 
analysis and a careful investigation of the facts are lacking. 
7. SPECIAL CASES OF HIGH INCOME IN LATIN-AMERICAN EXPORT ACTIVITIES 
In addition to the general problem common to all the Latin-American 
countries which has compelled them to adopt protective tariffs of one 
kind or another in order to sustain their economic development, there 
are several individual examples which, apart from their inherent interest, 
lend themselves to a theoretical interpretation which enables us to discern 
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the presence of elements of great importance to our former analyses. 
There are two Latin-American countries, Cuba and Venezuela, which have 
not devalued their currency and whose wages in terms of dollars have 
been maintained at a high level in their respective export industries. 
These high wages, when expressed in the terms of other devalued cur-
rencies, are considerably higher than wages in most Latin-American 
countries. But since in these two countries productivity is relatively low 
in comparison with other countries in the industries which they propose 
to develop in order to absorb the increase and surplus of their gainfully 
employed population and also to satisfy the needs of domestic consump-
tion, they find themselves compelled to resort to higher tariffs than are 
needed by other countries whose productivity is the same but whose 
wages are lower. This greater protection is undoubtedly one of the 
factors which explain the relatively higher prices ruling in these two 
countries in comparison with other Latin-American States that have 
devalued their currency. 
From this fact the following conclusion might be drawn : incomes being 
equal, the higher the wage level the higher must be the subsidy which 
a protective customs policy implies. 
As will be seen in due time, Cuba having learned from its experience 
of the catastrophic repercussions of cyclical depressions on its single-crop 
economy has resorted since 1927 to customs tariffs to protect its agri-
culture and industry, thus enabling these activities to absorb the manpower 
which the sugar industry could not have employed. Here we have one 
of the many examples of a peripheral country hampered by circumstances 
beyond its control which compel it to adjust policy to prevailing condi-
tions. In view of its natural facilities and its high productivity, Cuba 
could surely produce a great deal more sugar, for better or for worse, 
and so employ a great many more people in this activity or, alternatively, 
obtain a much higher rate of productivity from those now engaged in 
the industry. Cuba could conceivably upset sugar prices in the United 
States and supply most if not all of the consumer needs at the expense of 
the production of the United States and of other competitor countries. Cuba 
would, of course, have to lower its wage level to do this ; but it is possible, 
though not certain, that the total increment of real income obtained by 
the employment of more factors in undertakings of great productivity 
would be greater than that obtained at present by employing part of these 
factors in activities which, because of their lower productivity, require 
the protection of customs barriers. 
However, it is well known that, even should Cuba wish to follow 
this course, it could not do so because of the United States' restrictions 
on the import of sugar. This is evidently a case of protection which cannot 
be attributed to lower income in the competitor country so much as to 
its greater productivity. In this case the protective measure takes the 
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form of a quota as well as customs duties. Under the quota system Cuban 
sugar exports obtain a higher price on the American market than on the 
world market, as high in fact as the United States judges adequate to 
protect its high income level. 
Under these circumstances, Cuba obtains terms of trade for its sugar 
which are probably more favourable than those obtainable on the free 
market open to other producer countries with lower wage levels. But 
Cuba must also look for other activities in which to employ its surplus 
manpower. It is evident that the higher the rate of productivity it attains 
in such activities the greater will be the increment of its real income. 
Venezuela's experience is of equal interest both from the theoretical 
point of view and from that of political economy. Venezuela's petroleum 
industry pays wages which in terms of dollars are extremely high in com-
parison with other Latin-American countries. Furthermore, the State 
derives a very high income from petroleum (near 50 per cent of the net 
earnings of the producer companies). The direct effect of spreading of 
high wages from the petroleum industry to other activities is perhaps not 
very marked (much less so than that of the sugar industry in Cuba, 
without any doubt) since this industry only absorbs about 3 per cent of 
the gainfully employed population. However, the indirect effect which 
the spending of these wages presupposes, together with the disbursement 
of the large sums which the Government derives from petroleum, has 
been reflected in a great demand for labour, with a consequent rise in 
income ; and both these consequences have been extended to all branches 
of economic activity in the country. 
This would seem to be one of the factors which contributed to placing 
certain exports such as coffee and cocoa in an unfavourable position vis-à-
vis competition from other exporting countries. It explains the subsidy 
instituted by the Venezuelan Government for the export of these products 
which takes the form of a better exchange rate. This can, to a certain 
extent, be compared with the subsidy which used to be paid during the 
1930's to cover the difference between actual and "parity prices" in the 
United States. The resemblance is only partial, however, since it would 
appear that both coffee and cocoa are cultivated by primitive methods 
whereas technical progress in agriculture in the United States was very 
advanced. 
Thus the level of wages in Venezuela, as in Cuba, is higher than in 
other Latin-American countries, and hence relatively high tariffs are 
required in order to protect industry. Petroleum is far from absorbing 
the additional population of Venezuela and still less the surplus which 
might be released by technical progress in primary production. It has in 
fact created other problems which will be mentioned in due time. 
Our only purpose here was to indicate, within the limits of this chapter, 
the conditions that determine the creation of a high-income export in-
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dustry, in such low-income countries as Cuba and Venezuela formerly 
were. Thus in the domestic economy we encounter differences of levels 
which in time will be corrected by the mobility of the factors of production 
and require the enactment of measures to protect the new level of incomes. 
8. OBSTACLES TO HIGHER INCOME IN EXPORT INDUSTRIES 
These problems are to a certain extent new to the Latin-American 
periphery where wages in export activities have remained relatively low. 
Hence we should mention briefly the effects of higher incomes from 
export on the great industrial countries. In the case of the United States 
where, as we have so often pointed out in the present survey, imports 
represent a very small proportion of the national income, the increase of 
incomes in the export activities of supplier countries has relatively little 
effect. For instance, if in the case of a coefficient of 3 per cent imports 
become dearer by, say, 50 per cent, this would merely represent 1.5 per 
cent of the national income of the United States. By contrast, in coun-
tries with a higher coefficient, say 20 per cent, this could represent 10 
per cent of the national income. Hence, a country of this description is 
quite naturally preoccupied whenever any noticeable improvement occurs 
in the terms of trade of the peripheral countries. 
Consequently, except in special cases such as those outlined above, 
the attempt to raise income in the Latin-American countries by means 
of exports may run into serious difficulties caused by competition from 
other countries or regions in the periphery which are developing primary 
production, whilst they themselves have entered the phase of industrial 
evolution. Moreover, even in the exceptions referred to above, complica-
tions of another sort may arise; a recognized authority on petroleum 
has dealt precisely with the case of Venezuela and spoken of the possible 
adverse effects upon the country of the lower taxes and wages paid in 
other highly productive exporting areas.8 
9. EFFECTS OF DIFFERENCES IN INCOME AND PRODUCTIVITY ON RECIPROCAL 
TRADE IN LATIN AMERICA 
The effects of the differences of income and productivity, as analysed 
above, are not only visible in the relations between the periphery and 
the great industrial countries, or in those of the industrial countries inter se, 
but also in the relations between the peripheral countries inter se. These 
can, of course, be considered on the whole as countries of relatively low 
income. Yet there are differences, and sometimes very great differences, 
from country to country in both income and productivity. These differences, 
in conjunction with other factors, constitute one of the obstacles to re-
ciprocal economic understanding, especially in the case of neighbouring 
States. 
3
 See "El Petróleo en Venezuela" by Joseph E. Pogue. 
8 4 PART I. GROWTH, DISEQUILIBRIUM AND DISPARITIES 
A customs union has often been proposed as a means of widening narrow 
markets, and of contributing to the increase of productivity which mass 
production usually involves. However, differences of income or pro-
ductivity can create unfavourable competitive conditions similar to those 
analysed above. Furthermore, differences of income could become ag-
gravated by devaluation in one country or by varying levels of devaluation 
in different countries. 
It is conceivable that a country permanently or temporarily in an un-
favourable competitive position might find its own domestic production 
impaired by the increase of imports from another. It is obvious that, if 
the latter employed the increased purchasing power it thus obtained in the 
former country, exports would increase together with imports, and the 
disadvantage caused by displacing the factors of production would be 
amply compensated by the advantages accruing from the additional trade. 
However, as has been explained in another chapter, there is nothing in 
the free play of economic forces which will ensure this result automatically 
except in cases where the volume of trade is extremely large in proportion 
to national income, and that is not usually the case in Latin-American 
countries. On the contrary, owing to the disequilibrium and shortage 
of foreign exchange which beset practically all these countries, any Latin-
American country could use the proceeds of its surplus sales to another 
Latin-American country for importing capital goods from the centres, 
for instance, in which case the proceeds would be taken from the reciprocal 
trade. 
As mentioned before, frequent attempts have been made by bilateral 
treaties to obviate these effects. Usually these treaties have been short-
term measures. But they have not sought to attain a wider objective 
such as stimulating the exchange of industrial goods, so as to ensure a 
market in a given country for certain industrial goods deriving from 
the other in exchange for reciprocal concessions of equivalent worth. 
Little has been done in this direction. Meanwhile, it generally occurs 
in the process of industrialization that each country within its own 
frontiers attempts to develop both industrial and agricultural production 
of a type similar to that carried on across the frontier without regard 
either for specialization or consumption capacity. 
Such extremes were not reached in the industrial development of 
Europe owing to several factors, one of the most important being the 
fact that at that time there was no general scarcity of foreign exchange, 
as has already been pointed out. The countries which were then develop-
ing could therefore increase their exports continuously in order to com-
pensate for the steady increase of their imports. However, when foreign 
exchange did become scarce, during the 1930's, trade between industrial 
countries was seriously affected and the consequences were extremely 
grave for western Europe. One can therefore understand the far-reaching 
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consequences of the efforts sponsored insistently by the United States in 
order to stimulate such reciprocal trade. 
The purpose of the present chapter has been to point out the problems 
which arise, in highly developed countries as well as in those which are 
much less advanced and those in intermediary stages of development, as 
a result of differences in incomes and productivity. These problems have 
brought about the adoption of certain deliberate measures which, despite 
their manifest diversity, have a common feature since in the light of 
experience, they can all be attributed to the fact that no automatic solu-
tion has taken place in a world economy where conditions differ vastly 
from those described by the classical theorists. 
Among these measures are those of a protective nature which have 
always been adopted by countries in process of development. This state-
ment of fact does not imply the recommendation of specific policies, which 
would lie beyond the purpose of the present report. Our intention is 
merely to show that, since there is no other way of absorbing the gainfully 
employed population and increasing its productivity, the activities which 
can be developed by protective tariffs do, within certain limits, give rise 
to an increase in real income. Such limits were mentioned in last year's 
report. It can only be noted here that once these limits have been exceeded, 
contrary to the purpose pursued, real income diminishes rather than 
increases. 
